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Climate Strategy beyond Kyoto: How the EU Can Provide International Leadership”, which ran 
from September 2004 until April 2005. Participants in this CEPS Task Force included senior 
executives from a broad range of industry – including energy production and supply companies, 
energy-intensive industries and service companies – and representatives from business 
associations and environmental NGOs. A full list of members and invited guests and speakers 
appears in Annex 2. 
The members of the Task Force engaged in extensive debates in the course of several meetings 
and submitted comments on earlier drafts of this report. Its contents contain the general tone and 
direction of the discussion, but its recommendations do not necessarily reflect a full common 
position agreed among all members of the Task Force, nor do they necessarily represent the 
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Preface by the Chairmen 
limate change is increasingly recognised as a serious threat to the future of our societies. 
Furthermore, it is seen as part of a broader pattern of global change, caused by human 
activity. Some scientists maintain that we are living in a new geological era, the 
Anthropocene. Given the impact of climate change policies on core sectors of our economies, in 
particular energy and transport, the challenges associated with climate change policy are 
particularly daunting. Important economic and social interests are at stake. 
It is therefore not surprising that the road to a global response to climate change has been 
bumpy. The Framework Convention on Climate Change was concluded in 1992 and entered 
into force shortly thereafter; and the Kyoto Protocol, which specified precise quantitative 
commitments for industrialised countries, was agreed in 1997. When the United States decided 
not to ratify the Protocol in 2001, entry into force was uncertain for a long time. Finally, after a 
long-delayed Russian ratification, the Protocol became operative on 16 February 2005. The first 
Meeting of the Parties will be held in late November 2005 in Montreal. 
The Kyoto Protocol will now be fully implemented, and all the contracting Parties need to make 
efforts to fulfil their commitments. At the same time, preparations are under way for the 
negotiations that will determine the post-2012 climate regime. This is a major international 
effort that will require patience, imagination and political will. The European Union has played 
a major role in the climate negotiations from the beginning. A prerequisite for continued success 
in this new phase will be a continued and effective leadership on the part of the EU, a heavy 
responsibility that the European Council has recognised and accepted. 
Throughout this process, CEPS has supported these efforts through a careful analysis of climate 
change policies and presented its findings to a wide audience of policy-makers and negotiators. 
There has also been a strong commitment to providing a venue where different stakeholders can 
meet, exchange views and draw common conclusions. 
The present report is part of that effort. It is based on thorough discussions among a broadly-
based group of interested parties, including industry, environmental NGOs and researchers. 
Experts in different fields have made important contributions to the work of the Task Force. 
We have considered in detail a number of key issues that need to be addressed over the coming 
years and decades. Our group represents many different interests; accordingly, all findings and 
recommendations are not supported by everyone. But on the fundamental points we all agree: 
•  Climate change is a real threat and it must be addressed now. 
•  The EU must continue to play a leading role in the global effort to reduce the risks and 
dangers for the future. 
•  We support strong efforts within the EU to reduce emissions in a fair, equitable and cost-
effective way, recognising the need for a forward-looking climate policy. 
As we submit this report, we wish to express our thanks to the CEPS team supporting our work, 
and in particular to the Rapporteurs Christian Egenhofer and Louise van Schaik, and to their 
colleagues Noriko Fujiwara and Kyriakos Gialoglou for their contributions, and to Isabelle 
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TOWARDS A GLOBAL CLIMATE REGIME 
PRIORITY AREAS FOR A COHERENT EU STRATEGY 
REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
or several years now, the EU has identified combating climate change as among its most 
important challenges, and has accordingly been engaged in a concerted effort to develop 
cost-effective policies for a coherent climate strategy. Most recently, the spring 2005 
European Council endorsed the target of limiting the future global average temperature increase 
to 2°C above its pre-industrial level and indicated its willingness to explore with other countries 
the possibility of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from industrialised countries by 
15% to 30% from a 1990 level by the year 2020.  
This report attempts to identify priority areas for coherent EU domestic policies in the short, 
medium and long term.
1 It gives a first indication of what meeting EU climate objectives would 
imply in concrete terms. Finally, it tentatively describes the potential EU contribution to 
international negotiations. Towards that end, the report attempts to frame the key elements of a 
rational and credible EU strategy to achieve emissions reductions as mandated by member state, 
EU and international obligations to facilitate an agreement to combat climate change at the 
global level. 
This report focuses on policy coherence, cost-effective mitigation options in the short and 
medium-term and the interaction of such options with international negotiations in the ‘post-
2012 framework’. It is acknowledged that the overall climate change response must also take 
into consideration adaptation policies, even if the target of limiting the future global average 
temperature increase to 2°C above its pre-industrial level is met.  
I. Key  Messages 
1.  Tackling climate change poses one of the world’s greatest challenges. The evidence is 
getting stronger that most of the temperature rise that has occurred over the last 50 years is 
attributable to human activity. As GHG concentrations continue to increase, the potential 
impact of greenhouse gas emissions on people and ecosystems may prove to be significant. 
Such damage could also lead to considerable costs. Achieving the necessary reductions, 
such as proposed by the March 2005 European Council, will be very challenging (see Table 
2 and Box 2).  
2.  Meeting the global climate change challenge will need a long-term strategy engaging the 
EU and other Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Such a strategy 
should be built on a number of crucial elements, notably: i) inclusion of all major emissions 
sources, including CO2 from fossil fuels, non-CO2 gases, and CO2 from land-use change and 
forestry; ii) concern for economic and trade effects; iii) the active engagement of 
industrialised countries and – at least the rapidly industrialising – developing countries; and 
iv) attention to several important issues related to adaptation. A potential agreement that 
does not meet these preconditions will neither be environmentally effective, since it is 
expected that developing countries’ emissions will exceed those of industrialised countries 
by the year 2030, nor economically efficient, since restricted participation and coverage 
                                                 
1 This report uses the term ‘short term’ to refer to a time perspective between now and 2012. ‘Medium 
term’ describes the period up to around 2020-35, while the ‘long-term’ means until 2050 and beyond.  
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increases overall compliance costs. And it would be inequitable, and therefore likely to 
become discredited.  
3.  Technology will play a central role in meeting the climate change challenge. Since 
technology takes considerable time to develop and to diffuse, increasing the efficiency of 
existing technologies in the short and medium term offers the greatest potential for 
reductions in GHG emissions, in combination with accelerated diffusion of technology, i.e. 
to encourage the use of the most efficient technologies currently available in a cost-effective 
manner. In the long term, ‘breakthrough’ technologies must be developed.  
4.  Incentives for abatement and innovation are inexorably linked. Governments have to both: 
i) provide proper incentives for environmental protection and innovation and ii) supplement 
private sector research with publicly-funded R&D that is not undertaken by private 
investors due to the likelihood of market failure. Regardless of how environmentally 
beneficial new technologies may be, they will have little influence on the rate at which 
firms retire older, more polluting plants in the absence of policies promoting technology or 
requiring reductions in emissions. It is also important to focus the debate on technology 
transfer, with a view to identifying which policies constitute an enabling regulatory 
framework and which constitute a barrier.  
5.  A strong commitment to climate change policy by the EU has helped to keep the issue on 
the international agenda. A continuation of this commitment is important. The impact of the 
EU’s leadership can be increased by presenting a credible, multilateral climate change 
strategy that minimises costs and holds out the promise of leading to economic and social 
benefits. Hence, there is a need for cost-effective solutions, achieved through the 
appropriate use of market-based instruments and taking into account distributional effects.  
II. Recommendations   
1.  It will be extremely difficult to meet the 2°C target. Therefore, the EU and its member states 
need to develop a coherent and comprehensive long-term strategy, taking into account the 
existing lead times related to capital stock turnover and to infrastructure development. 
Priority should be given to those strategies that provide co-benefits in terms of economic 
efficiency, security of supply, containment of local pollution or innovation and job creation.  
2.  The large potential for improvements in energy efficiency and conservation must be realised 
through immediate action, both by speeding up technology diffusion and introducing 
incremental changes in standard practices. This entails developing a comprehensive energy 
efficiency strategy based on the strengthening of existing and forthcoming EU legislation. 
Immediate priority should be given to existing buildings and housing as they constitute a 
great yet untapped potential for decreasing energy consumption. 
3.  Further work needs to be carried out in the highly promising area of substituting existing 
products with other products promising lower climate-change impact. 
4.  To facilitate the development of new technologies, the EU and its member states must 
develop a comprehensive technology policy that combines incentives both for reductions in 
GHG emissions and for R&D and innovation. 
5.  Research in climate-friendly technologies (e.g. in energy or transport) must become a 
priority in the EU and member state research policies and receive increased resources 
devoted to their development.
2 Research on climate science must also be explicitly fostered.  
                                                 
2 For example, through the EU’s 7
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6.  The EU should play a leadership role in encouraging the use of new technologies and 
favouring technology investment and technology transfer. It must pursue integration of the 
UNFCCC activities on technology transfer, capacity-building and the project-based 
mechanisms, CDM and JI, to ensure the development of a coherent, global strategy that will 
facilitate the rapid diffusion and deployment of new and existing technology and know-
how.  
7.  Member states must develop and implement sustainable energy strategies that are coherent 
and consistent, and that provide a long-term investment framework designed to 
progressively ensure cost-efficient and less-carbon-intensive energy and industrial 
production in Europe and must support similar developments abroad.
3  
8.  Road transport strategies should be adopted that aim at accelerating improvements in 
vehicle emissions performance throughout the full life cycle as well as promoting shifts in 
preferred modes of transport. 
9.  The EU should bring into line its external policies – such as development cooperation, trade 
and the neighbourhood policy – with climate objectives. It must equally seek to align 
funding priorities of EU and international financial institutions (IFIs) with the objective of 
tackling climate change.  
10. In order to meet its own climate targets in a cost-effective way, the EU must take the lead in 
promoting a comprehensive and differentiated framework that could facilitate full 
participation after 2012, based on a continuation of the key elements of the Kyoto Protocol.  
11. Strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions post-2012, with a view to the stabilising and 
reducing atmospheric concentrations, must be guided by the latest scientific knowledge and 
the recognition that global participation will be necessary to achieve a meaningful and 
significant impact. 
III. Full Summary 
1.  According to the Third Assessment Report of the  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change of the United Nations, evidence is getting stronger that most of the temperature rise 
over the last 50 years is attributable to human activity. It warns that an increase in global 
temperature is likely to trigger serious consequences for humanity and other life forms 
alike. 
2.  The EU has set itself a target of limiting the temperature increase to a maximum of 2°C. It is 
uncertain, however, whether this target will actually avoid serious consequences. Since 
GHG emissions stay in the atmosphere for a long time, delaying action now risks making 
the challenge bigger in the future. Continued research in climate science will be needed. 
3.  Technology will play a central role in meeting the climate change challenge. While there are 
different opinions on whether medium-term goals can be reached with technically-proven 
technology, it is generally accepted that there is a need to develop new and technically 
unproven (i.e. breakthrough) technologies for the long-term.  
4.  There appears to be a positive correlation between productivity and levels of research and 
specialisation in high-tech activities. Spending 1.9% of its GDP on R&D – from both the 
private and public sectors– the EU is lagging behind Japan and the US, with expenditures of 
2.9% and 2.6%, respectively.  
                                                 
3 Governments can pursue one or a combination of four principal options: improving the efficiency of 
current technologies; renewables; carbon capture and storage; and nuclear.  vi | EGENHOFER & VAN SCHAIK  
 
5.  R&D is a matter of both private sector and public spending. R&D can be left to the market 
when it comes to the application of new technologies, i.e. the area of commercial 
development or improved efficiency. In areas where the profitability is uncertain, however, 
due to for example the level of economic risk or a very long time horizon or both (e.g. 
fusion, hydrogen, CO2 capture and storage), government support is needed.  
6.  Since most emissions growth will be outside the industrialised countries, the diffusion of 
efficient applicable technologies to developing countries is crucial. The success of 
technology transfer depends principally on sound and stable conditions for investment. To 
address the potential needs of developing countries, such as capacity-building or financial 
support, other additional instruments may be needed. The use of flexible mechanisms and 
rules and instruments of IFIs in ensuring diffusion would be particularly important 
components.  
7.  The capital stock, as reflected in investment in power plants, grids or refineries, has value 
for decades. Attempts to reduce emissions ‘too quickly’ may require premature retirement 
of invested capital, which in return increases abatement costs significantly. Delaying 
reductions, on the other hand, raises costs for future action because the investments that are 
undertaken now will last for decades and may therefore continue to pollute for a long time. 
The importance of this issue at the present time is underlined by the need for investments in 
the capital stock over the next 20 years. 
Public infrastructure 
8.  A special case is public infrastructure, which through its long life span predetermines 
production and consumption patterns over a long period of time. Decisions taken by 
governments today will be decisive in terms of reducing emissions for decades to come. As 
for existing infrastructure, however, better management can produce important short-term 
results. 
Policy coherence  
9.  Standard ‘climate technologies’ refer to energy efficiency, fuel switching or insulation. As a 
result, coherence means consistency of energy, transport and many other EU policies with 
the climate change policy objective of reducing GHG emissions. Further policy coherence 
could be achieved by a common EU energy policy. The EU’s external policies, namely 
trade, development cooperation and the EU neighbourhood policy, would need to be aligned 
with climate objectives as well.  
Synergies 
10. Climate change policy has many co-benefits such as the reduction of local pollution caused 
by NOx or SO2, innovation and technological leapfrogging. Thus, climate policy is likely to 
have significant, yet unforeseen benefits.  
Sector-specific policies  
11. Energy efficiency holds the greatest potential to reduce GHG emissions. More efficient use 
of energy in a wide range of applications, including vehicles, electrical appliances, lighting 
and industrial uses, could account for almost 60% of the potential short-term reduction in 
CO2 emissions. Governments have yet to implement policies to achieve these goals.  
12. Transport is a crucial sector (together with power) for climate change policy. Transport is a 
significant contributor to economic growth and enables people to participate in economic 
and social activity. At the same time, the fast-growing transport sector is responsible for 
somewhat more than 20% of total CO2 emissions, and this figure does not include maritime TOWARDS A GLOBAL CLIMATE REGIME | vii 
 
shipping and international aviation. While hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles offer great 
promise in the long-term for reducing GHG emissions, in the short and mid-term, there is 
major scope for technological cost-effective improvement of the existing conventional 
technologies, such as the internal combustion engine. Also on the fuel side there are major 
reduction potentials.  
13. In the long-term, hydrogen (H2) may become the principal preferred energy carrier for the 
road transport sector, as it is able to supply the necessary volumes and meet environmental 
standards. Hydrogen faces two basic challenges, however, the first being the development 
of effective infrastructure and the second being the development of vehicle technology. 
There is still controversy over which challenge will prove the more difficult to overcome 
when considering the potential for large-scale use of hydrogen.  
14. An important factor will be the rate of renewal of the vehicle fleet, given that new vehicles 
must meet much stricter standards. In the case of private cars (the great majority of new 
vehicles), however, it is important to realise that a shift to larger, heavier cars does not 
offset the improvements in energy efficiency and environmental impact. Better 
infrastructure management could reduce emissions.  
15. Further scope exists in modal shifts, such as from aviation to rail for short-hauls, to public 
transport or non-motorised trips for urban transport and some shift of freight transport to 
rail. Generally speaking, the passenger sector has more scope for modal shift as it tends to be 
more responsive to price changes. Conversely, much less scope exists for reducing the rate of 
growth in freight demand. There is also a role to be played by land-use planning to reduce the 
need for longer motorised journeys, for example in the location of shops.  
16. Generation of electricity from fossil fuels, notably natural gas and coal, is another major 
growing contributor to CO2 emissions. There are four possible options for reducing CO2 
emissions from power generation: i) increased efficiency in transmission/distribution, 
generation and fuel switching, mainly to gas; ii) expansion of renewable energy sources 
such as wind, solar, biomass and geothermal; iii) capture of CO2 emissions at fossil-fuelled 
(especially coal) electric generation plants and permanent sequestering of the carbon; and 
iv) nuclear power.  
a.  Energy efficiency in power generation and transmission/distribution depends on a 
combination of improved performance (due to technological progress) and market 
penetration of such new technologies. The latter is largely a function of when new 
technologies become economically viable.  
b.  The uptake of new renewables will depend on their competitiveness with existing 
technologies. Policy can play an important role in bringing down costs, through R&D 
subsidies on the one hand and by support mechanisms, which ensure a certain level of 
market penetration, on the other. Increased market penetration historically has proven to 
reduce costs.  
c.  Carbon capture and storage are seen by many as a key technology to combat climate 
change. It would enable the continuation of coal-fired power plants since many 
countries see no short- and medium-term alternative to coal owing to its advantages 
both in terms of economics and security of supply. The technical potential appears to be 
very high. Main issues remaining for further analysis include, for example, safety and 
leakage issues (i.e. permanence), economic viability and accurate assessment of storage 
capacities. Further research will be needed before large-scale application can occur. 
d.  Nuclear power in principle is a potential source of GHG emissions reductions over the 
next 50 years. At present, however, nuclear power faces stagnation and decline 
according to most forecasts, for reasons of cost, safety, waste and proliferation. In order viii | EGENHOFER & VAN SCHAIK  
 
to reverse nuclear decline, changes in governmental policies are likely to be needed. 
There are also questions on the availability of sufficient uranium.  
17. Buildings and houses constitute one of the biggest potential areas for GHG emissions 
reductions. They are responsible for about 40% of all CO2 emissions in the EU if all 
electricity to end-use sectors and heat-related emissions are included. For example, an 
extension of the Directive on energy performance in buildings to all houses could save up to 
70 Mt CO2 p.a., which is equivalent to 2.4% of 1990 EU-15 emissions.  
18. From both a practical and a strategic perspective, the EU ETS is the centrepiece of EU 
climate policy. Not only does it cover almost one-half of EU CO2 emissions, it is also 
difficult to perceive absolute caps without the flexibility provided by emissions trading. At 
the same time, the potential of the EU ETS to achieve significant reductions at least to date 
remains uncertain and will depend on a future global agreement. It is unrealistic to assume 
that EU governments would impose a significant carbon constraint on ‘their’ companies 
unless major competitors would be willing to do the same. As of April 2005, the initial 
contribution of the EU ETS remains limited. It is estimated that the EU ETS’ contribution 
under the first round of allocation would contribute to an annual savings of around 100 Mt 
CO2 in the power sector. The 2006 EU ETS review, which will include allocation, sector 
coverage, new gases and distributional impacts, will be crucial for the future of the EU ETS. 
19. Another means of reducing environmental and climate impact is product substitution, for 
which the construction, transport, car manufacturing and telecommunications sectors, in 
particular, offer significant opportunities. As changes rely on infrastructure (e.g. building 
codes, skills in the construction business, supply of raw materials), the potential for 
substitution should be seen in a longer-term perspective and is unlikely to play a significant 
role in a 2030 perspective.  
The post-2012 international architecture 
20. The principal challenge for the post-2012 architecture is to identify the nature and level of 
commitment that will provide sufficient incentives for all Parties, especially the largest 
emitters, to join a global agreement and achieve meaningful reductions in GHG emissions. 
A review of the literature suggests that there is no single framework, including the Kyoto 
Protocol, that would meet all possible evaluation criteria, such as the environmental 
outcome, economic efficiency, cost-effectiveness, distributional impacts, flexibility and 
simplicity and incentives to participate and comply.  
21. Although there are different views worldwide as to whether a post-2012 framework should 
be built on the Kyoto Protocol, it is fair to say that the Kyoto Protocol has established or 
reinforced numerous areas where an international consensus has emerged or at least may be 
achievable. These include: i) differentiation, ii) a comprehensive approach to all emissions 
sources, iii) gradualism, iv) flexibility and v) flexible mechanisms.  
22. It is realistic to expect that a comprehensive agreement on the post-2012 regime will need to 
ensure a fair amount of continuity with the Kyoto Protocol structure, while at the same time 
accommodating a number of additional components aimed at attracting universal 
participation in a global agreement. The following elements should be taken into 
consideration in any debate on a post-2012 regime: 
a.  Nature of commitments. The Kyoto Protocol has set absolute targets for industrialised 
countries. The merit of this approach has been its relative simplicity and sensitivity to 
environmental integrity. The downside is their inherent inflexibility, notably as regards 
accommodating differences in population or economic growth. This has raised renewed 
interest, notably outside Europe, in alternative ways to formulate commitments such as, TOWARDS A GLOBAL CLIMATE REGIME | ix 
 
for example, intensity targets, sectoral policies, technology approaches or combinations 
thereof. In parallel, there is an interest in providing additional flexibility to absolute 
targets via flexible mechanisms, banking, the periodic of review of targets and possibly 
most importantly, a ceiling (i.e. price cap) on allowance prices.  
b.  Flexible mechanisms, including emissions trading. An absolute target approach must be 
seen in conjunction with emissions trading, both in the EU and internationally. As the 
EU continues to advocate absolute emissions limits (i.e. Kyoto Protocol-type caps), 
emissions trading almost becomes a prerequisite to achieve these caps in a least-cost 
fashion, provided potential distributional impacts can be addressed. Should absolute 
caps prevail, emissions trading is almost certainly to occupy a central place in the post-
2012 regime.  
c.  Adaptation. Based on existing knowledge, adaptation measures both in the EU and 
other industrialised and developing countries are likely to become a crucial pillar upon 
which an eventual global agreement will rest. More work needs to be done in this area. 
d.  Technology approaches. In the medium to the long term, technology will play a 
decisive role, as ultimately stabilisation of GHG emissions, in line with the UNFCCC’s 
objective, can only be met with new breakthrough technologies. There is a case to be 
made in favour of designing an enabling framework for technology diffusion via for 
example technology protocols.  
e.  Domestic policies. A focus on the potential of short- and medium-term domestic 
policies that accommodate individual and natural circumstances can help Parties to base 
negotiating positions on a firmer footing. This will implicitly provide an authoritative 
analysis of underlying costs and benefits.  
f.  Institutional framework. There is a possibility to make a distinction between the UN’s 
role as the negotiations platform and as ‘coordination’ body for implementation. While 
informal negotiations can and in reality will take place in many different fora, including 
the UN but also the G8 among others, there is little alternative to the UNFCCC to 
oversee coordination of the management for example of the flexible mechanisms, the 
registry system, national communications or compliance rules. It may be possible, 
however, to delegate certain coordination tasks to executive agencies.  
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Introduction 
he entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol represents an important step towards reaching a 
global approach to climate change. More than 130 countries have ratified the agreement, 
encompassing most of the world’s industrialised, transition and developing countries. 
Nevertheless, the Kyoto Protocol is only a first step. An effective and equitable agreement 
requires the full engagement of all countries, in particular the largest emitters from both the 
industrialised and the developing worlds. Without the participation of all principal emitters, the 
objectives of reducing GHG emissions and stabilising concentrations will most likely not be 
met. However, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, as enshrined in the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), requires ambitious 
actions from industrialised countries first.  
Discussions on a ‘post-2012’ framework, i.e. for the period after the Kyoto Protocol’s expiration 
in 2012, have started in earnest within the EU and internationally. Many proposals for a post-
2012 architecture have been put forward. Whether based on the Kyoto Protocol or on other 
approaches, they will need to find solutions to further emissions reductions. Such solutions are 
more likely to be found if the EU, but also other Parties to the UNFCCC, are successful in 
developing a comprehensive long-term strategy or ‘vision’, including the different necessary 
ingredients of a successful approach to climate change: mitigation (including technology 
development), sinks and adaptation. 
This report attempts to identify priority areas for coherent EU domestic policies in the short to 
the long run.
1 It gives some first indications on what meeting EU climate objectives would 
imply in concrete terms. It tentatively describes a rational and credible EU strategy to achieve 
an agreement to combat climate change at the global level.  
The following analysis is primarily concerned with mitigation; hence, it focuses on the interface 
between government policy and technology development and diffusion. Neither policy nor 
technology on its own is sufficient to address the challenges of climate change. Both are 
necessary to reduce emissions in the magnitude needed. As we will show, incentives for 
abatement and for innovation are inexorably linked and both will be needed simultaneously to 
meet the climate challenge. 
This report and its accompanying policy recommendations are meant as a contribution to the EU 
long-term strategy for combating climate change. On the one hand, these are aimed at internal 
EU discussions. On the other, the report seeks to contribute to discussions on climate change in 
international fora outside the EU, such as the G-8 or the UNFCCC.  
This report places a strong emphasis of be on cost-effectiveness, i.e. achieving the necessary 
objectives at the least possible cost.  
                                                 
1 This report uses the term ‘short term’ to mean a time perspective until 2012. ‘Medium term’ describes 
the period up to around 2020-35, while ‘long term’ means until 2050 and beyond. 
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Following this brief introduction, the main report is structured in 7 sections. Section 1 
introduces the challenges associated with climate change, while sections 2 and 3 present key 
climate-relevant data on sources of GHG emissions and data regarding growth and energy 
demand. Section 4 introduces preconditions for meeting climate objectives and argues for policy 
coherence. Section 5 develops an indicative proposal for a medium-term domestic EU climate 
change strategy (from approximately 2020 to 2025). Section 6 addresses the EU climate change 
strategy in the international context, and section 7 makes some concluding remarks.  
The main findings of the report are contained in the Executive Summary, which includes Key 
Messages and Recommendations.  
The report has two annexes, the first of which contains a glossary of technical terms and 
abbreviations, while the second contains a list of members of the Task Force and invited guests 
and speakers.  
1. Climate  change   
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Third Assessment 
Report (IPCC, 2001), evidence is getting stronger that most of the temperature rise that has 
occurred over the last 50 years is attributable to human activity. This authoritative scientific 
body warns that an increase in global temperatures is likely to trigger serious consequences for 
humanity and other life forms, including a rise in sea levels, which will endanger coastal areas 
and small islands, and a greater frequency and severity of extreme weather events. On behalf of 
the EU, the European Environment Agency (EEA, 2004a) found similar indications.
2  
 
Box 1. Climate change: Some examples of expected impact on social, economic and natural 
systems 
•  Rise in sea level: Loss of coastal land/wetlands and increased costs of protection against floods 
•  Agricultural production: Adversely affected by droughts, desertification, changing rainfall patterns, 
extreme weather events, etc. 
•  Energy use: Changes in heating and cooling due to changing weather 
•  Human health: Higher incidence of the spread of diseases 
•  Eco-systems: Loss of productivity and biodiversity 
•  Water: Changes in resources, supply and quality 
•  Infrastructure: Damage through drought, flooding, extreme weather, etc. 
•  Migration: Through desertification or major events in the climate (e.g. collapse of the Gulf stream) 
Sources: European Commission (2005b); IPCC (2001). 
 
As early as 1996, the EU adopted a long-term target of limiting the temperature increase to a 
maximum of 2°C.
3 This was recently reiterated by the Environment Council in December 2004 
with reference to the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report and reaffirmed by the European Council 
                                                 
2 Recent research on the scientific understanding and long-term implications of climate change as well as 
options to reach such goals were presented at the UK government-sponsored Conference on Avoiding 
Dangerous Climate Change, which was held in Exeter on 1-3 February 2005 (see 
http://www.stabilisation2005.com/index.html). 
3 See Conclusions of the Council of the European Union, meeting in Luxembourg in June 1996 (Council 
of the European Union, 1996). TOWARDS A GLOBAL CLIMATE REGIME | 3 
 
in March 2005: “the overall global mean surface temperature increase should not exceed 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels”.
4 It is uncertain whether this target will be sufficient to actually 
avoid ‘serious consequences’, as climate sensitivities are high and there is still much we do not 
know about climate change.  
In the judgement of the Environment Council of December 2004, CO2 concentrations may need 
to be stabilised below 550 ppmv CO2 equivalent, which translates into around 450/475 ppmv 
CO2 only in order to have a reasonable chance of limiting global warming to no more than the 
EU target of 2°C
 .
5 This level is significantly lower than the concentration levels previously 
mentioned by the EU in conjunction with this target. In comparison, pre-industrial CO2 
concentration levels stood at 280 ppm while they have increased to 370 ppm to date, leading to 
an increase in the average global temperature by almost 1°C. In the absence of measures, there 
will be no stabilisation below 700 or even 1,000 ppm. Such levels, according to the IPCC, are 
likely to lead to very damaging impacts, including structural alterations to weather patterns or 
even to changes of important ocean currents, such as the Gulf Stream. Furthermore, it is part of 
a broader pattern of global change caused by human activity.  
It would be very difficult to achieve stabilisation at less than 550 ppmv CO2 equivalent (450/475 
CO2 only), as that would require a peak of global emissions before 2020 (see Table 1), since 
GHG emissions stay in the atmosphere for a long time.
6 Tentative illustrations of the scale of 
the challenge in practical terms are provided in Table 2 and Box 2. 
Table 1. Conditions for stabilising CO2 concentrations 




2001 to 2100 (GtC) 
Year in which global 
emissions peak 
Year in which global 
emissions fall below 
the 1990 level 
450 365-735  2005-2015  <2000-2040 
550 590-1135  2020-2030  2030-2100 
650 735-1370  2030-2045  2055-2145 
750 820-1500  2040-2060  2080-2180 
1000 905-1620  2065-2090  2135-2270 
Source: IPCC (2001). 
Furthermore, the timing of policies required for drastic reduction of emissions concentration 
levels would not necessarily match investment cycles for capital investment in the principal 
emitting sectors of energy and transport (see section 4). Major transformations of infrastructure 
typically stretch over long periods of time, i.e. several decades. For example, most power plants 
last for almost half a century. Even short-lived gas turbines operate for at least a quarter of a 
century. And cars may be driven for up to 20 years. Early depreciation of the invested capital 
increases the cost to a considerable extent. For example, aiming at stabilisation at 650 ppmv 
CO2 equivalent, which would be more in tune with investment cycles, could reduce the total 
abatement costs by about one-quarter compared to a goal of 550 ppmv (European Commission, 
                                                 
4 Cited in the European Council Presidency Conclusions. 
5 The indicator for potential climate change impacts is concentrations of GHG emissions as expressed for 
example in parts per million (ppm) or ppmv (ppm in volume) of CO2 o nl y  or  C O 2 equivalent. CO2 
equivalent means that the other greenhouse gases – CH4, N2O, SF6, PFCs and HFCs – are translated into 
CO2 on the basis of their global warming potential (GWP). Since not all greenhouse gases stay in the 
atmosphere for the same length of time, the relationship between CO2 and CO2  equivalent varies 
depending upon the time frame one takes into account.  
6 For example, CO2 stays in the atmosphere for about 100 years. What we emit today will cause damage 
for a long time in the future.  4 | EGENHOFER & VAN SCHAIK  
 
2005a, p. 15). However, in all likelihood, such a target would not be sufficient to succeed in 
limiting a global average temperature increase to 2°C above pre-industrial levels.  
2.  Greenhouse gases and their sources 
The Kyoto Protocol covers six greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), perfluorcarbons (PCFs) and hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs). Each has a different global warming potential (GWP), according to the expected 
impacts. In terms of volume, the most important one is CO2, which is often used as a proxy for 
all GHGs. There are important differences between regions as to sources and impacts. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, CO2 from fossil fuel combustion accounts for 59% of total global GHG 
emissions, CO2 from land use change and forestry represent 18% and non-CO2 gases, 23%. 
Among the non-CO2 gases, the most significant are methane (14%) and nitrous oxide (8%). 
They are more important in the developing countries. The high GWP F-gases,
7 which represent 
only 1% of global GHG emissions, are emitted almost exclusively by highly industrialised 
countries (Baumert & Pershing, 2004).  













Source: Baumert & Pershing (2004, pp. 5-6). 
 
Hence, CO2 emissions (both from fossil fuels and from land-use change and forestry) are the 
most important GHG emissions, accounting for 77% of total global emissions and even 81% of 
overall emissions in industrialised countries (Baumert & Pershing, 2004).  
Whereas land-use change in industrialised countries is believed to result in a net absorption of 
CO2, in developing countries it generally represents 30% and in the least developing countries 
even more than 60% of greenhouse gas emissions (Baumert & Pershing, 2004). In some cases, 
CO2 emissions related to land-use change and forestry are not included in emissions figures 
because of uncertainties associated with their calculation. Nevertheless, they matter in a global 
perspective since in countries such as Indonesia and Brazil, CO2 emissions from land-use 
change and forestry are a principal emissions source.  
                                                 
7 The three high global warming potential gases, or so-called ‘F-gases’, are sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), 
perfluorcarbons PFCs) and hydrofluorcarbons (HFCs).  
CH4 Methane 
N2O Nitrous  oxide 
CO2 LUC  Carbon dioxide from 
land-use change and 
forestry 
CO2 FF  Carbon dioxide from 
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Source: Baumert & Pershing (2004, pp. 5-6). 
 
Within the EU, the principal GHG emitting sources by sector are energy supply (excluding 
transport), industry, agriculture, waste management and transport. All sectors but transport have 
witnessed a reduction in the period 1990-2002 (EEA, 2004b). The energy and transport sectors 
are responsible for about four-fifth of total emissions in the EU.  
It is expected that transport (together with power generation) will be the main contributors to 
emissions growth within the EU. According to the European Commission, transport-related 
emissions are projected to grow by around 50% between 1990 and 2010 (European 
Commission, 2001). The transport sector would become the primary source of CO2 emissions in 
the EU-15 between 2005 and 2020, only to be overtaken by power generation thereafter. In the 
new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, transport-related CO2 emissions may 
even grow up to 70% in 2030 against the 2000 baseline (see Zachariadis & Kouvaritakis, 
2003).
8  When electricity-related emissions are allocated to end-users, the picture changes: 
industry then becomes the largest contributor followed directly by transport and households at 
equally high level (see Figure 4). The difference is that transport is fast-growing while 
households remain constant (Barbier et al., 2004). This illustrates the importance of industry, 
transport and households when considering options for reducing GHG emissions.  
                                                 
8 By around 2030, one-half of the world’s population may be living in developing countries – many of 
them with fast-growing economies. It is expected that such countries will account for most of the net 
increase of the motor vehicle fleet.  
CH4 Methane 
N2O Nitrous  oxide 
CO2 LUC  Carbon dioxide from land-use change and forestry 




























































Energy supply and use 
excluding transport 
CO2 from fossil-fuel combustion in electricity and heat production, refineries, 
manufacturing industries, households and services. 
Transport CO2 from fossil-fuel combustion and N2O from catalytic converters. 
Industrial processes  CO2 from cement production, N2O from chemical industry, HFCs from replacing 
CFCs in cooling appliances and from production of thermal insulation foams. 
Agriculture CH4 from enteric fermentation and manure management and N2O from soils and 
manure management. 
Waste management  CH4 from waste disposal sites. 
Source: EEA (2004b, p. 24). 
 
 
Figure 4. Sectoral CO2 emissions in the EU-15 with electricity-related emissions allocated to 


















Source: Barbier et al. (2004). 
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3.  Growth, development, energy demand and climate objectives  
It is sobering to look at global energy demand projections against the background of climate 
change objectives. In ‘business as usual’ scenarios, world energy demand is projected to grow 
by around 60% or even more until 2030 (IEA, 2004a; European Commission, 2003; 
ExxonMobil, 2004), which means an average annual growth rate of more than 1.6%. Until 
2050, global energy demand will double or possibly even triple (WBCSD, 2004a; see also 
Figure 5). The main drivers of increasing global energy demand are economic development, and 
projected population growth in developing countries. World economic growth is expected to 
average around 3% annually while the population will grow at an average of 1% per year 
according to most forecasts. Hence population could increase to 9 billion by 2050 (see UN, 
2004).  
It is realistic to assume that the EU and the world at large will continue to rely on fossil fuels as 
the principal fuels for the time being. The IEA (2004a) assumes that fossil fuels will continue to 
dominate global energy use in 2030, accounting for some 85% of the increase in world energy 
demand. Total global CO2 emissions are expected to grow to over 50 billion tonnes. 
By 2030, two-thirds of the increase in global energy demand will come from developing 
countries. Around 2025 to 2030, developing countries are projected to overtake industrialised 
countries in absolute terms of GHG emissions. This means that even considerable reductions in 
GHG emissions in the industrialised world will not suffice to achieve stabilisation.  
In order to achieve stabilisation of GHG concentrations at a level of 550 ppm CO2, based on 
work by the IPCC (2001), there is a need to reduce global CO2 emissions by 22 billion tonnes of 
CO2 per year by 2050 as compared to a ‘business as usual’ scenario, which is slightly less than 
current total global emissions
9 (see Figure 5 and WBCSD, 2004a). This corresponds to a 40% 
reduction compared to ‘business as usual’.  
 



































• A1B-AIM • B2-AIM




* 22 Gt CO2 is equal to 6-7 Gt of carbon. 
Source: WBCSD (2004a), based on scenarios from the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report 
(IPCC, 2001). 
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Table 2 illustrates the scale of the task by citing several massive activities whose 
implementation could achieve reductions of 3.3 billion tonnes of CO2 emissions (or 1 gigatonne 
of carbon). For example, one could install 150 times the current wind power capacity, bring into 
operation 1 billion hydrogen cars to replace conventional 30 (US) miles per gallon (7.84 litres 
per 100 kms) cars or install five times the current nuclear capacity. Alternatively, one could use 
half of the US agricultural area for biomass production. 
Table 2. The challenge: 3.3 billion tonnes of CO2 emissions reduction per year requires… 
Reductions to achieve 550 ppm stabilisation (-22 Gt CO2 by 2100) 
Technology  Required for 3.3 Gt CO2/yr 
Coal-fired power plant with CO2 capture/ storage  700 x 1 GW plants 
Nuclear power plants replace average plant  1500 x 1 GW (5 x current) 
Wind power replaces average plant  150 x current 
Solar PV displace average plant  5 x 106 ha (2000x current) 
Hydrogen fuel  1 billion H2 cars (CO2-free H2) displacing 
1 billion conventional 30 mpg (7.84 litres per 100 
kms) cars  
Geological storage of CO2  Inject 100 mb/d fluid at reservoir conditions 
Biomass fuels from plantations  100 x 106 ha (half of US agricultural area) 
Source: Presentation by ExxonMobil to the Task Force at its meeting on 22 October 2004 (http://www.ceps.be/files/TF/1). 
The objective of a 15-30% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020, as has been proposed in the 
Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of 22 and 23 March 2005, is a similar 
challenge. Possible options for achieving a 20% reduction in CO2 emissions under a mid-range 
growth scenario are summarised in Box 2. 
Box 2. Possible combination of options to achieve 20% CO2 reductions by 2025 in the EU 
•  Coal. Consumption of coal remains constant, but nearly a third of coal-fired generation must use 
sequestration. This means that zero emissions from coal-fired generation must become a fully 
commercial ‘off-the-shelf’ process in the near future.  
•  Mobility. Vehicle kms increase by 20%, but oil consumption falls by 30% as vehicle efficiency 
improves by over 50% (for the on-road fleet) and bio-fuels make up 8% of the vehicle fuel mix. 
•  Natural gas consumption would need to increase by 50%, mainly for power generation. As the total 
emissions budget shrinks but energy demand rises, it is unavoidable that coal and oil emissions 
would be reduced to make way for gas.  
•  A marked shift to electricity (nearly double) to minimise end-user emissions. 
- 10-fold increase in wind-power (80,000 units of 5 MW turbines in place) 
- No decline in nuclear, but growth of 10% (over the whole period, not per annum) 
- Distributed solar power provides 5% of electricity needs 
Note: These figures are based on the assumption that there is a 6% growth in energy demand in the EU – over the 
20 year period covered – as a combined result of energy efficiency in highly developed countries and improvements 
in standards of living in accession and cohesion countries.  
Source: Shell (this set of options should not be considered as an actual scenario for the EU, but merely as an 
illustration of what set of measures taken in combination might result in an emissions reduction of 20% by 2025). TOWARDS A GLOBAL CLIMATE REGIME | 9 
 
It becomes clear that in order to meet the climate change challenge, there is a need to change the 
energy use/development relationship in the direction towards a fundamentally lower energy 
intensity trajectory (i.e. GDP/energy consumption). This will require both behavioural changes 
and better utilisation of energy through improved technologies. Finally, this implies a global 
effort while taking into account the special needs of developing countries. At the same time, it 
will be crucial to keep the costs of climate change policies as low as possible (see Box 3). 
Box 3. Reducing the costs of mitigation and adaptation 
Historically the fear of (excessive) costs has been a major impediment to full participation in the Kyoto 
Protocol both by industrialised and developing countries. Hence, the cost issue has been at the centre 
of the post-2012 debate (see e.g. Aldy et al., 2003). Some considerations in attempting to lower costs 
include:  
•  Emissions trading. By theoretically ensuring that the market price of carbon is equal to the lowest 
marginal abatement cost among all controlled sources, emissions trading helps to meet 
environmental goals at least cost. The gains can be considerable: a majority of studies find that full 
emissions trading would halve the compliance costs (see e.g. IPCC, 2001). The EU ETS is 
expected to reduce total compliance costs incurred by the covered sector by one-third. Emissions 
trading has distributional impacts, however, which in some cases can lead to economic rents that 
undermine efficiency.  
•  Projects mechanisms. Even if credits from the project mechanisms are not fully fungible (e.g. in 
EU ETS), they still offer possibilities for low-cost options.  
•  Sector coverage. Costs for the economy as a whole will decrease to the extent that all sources (or 
sectors) are covered by climate policies and ideally make a comparable effort. This ensures that the 
highest possible number of low-cost reduction opportunities is achieved. Distributional impacts, 
however, might lead to the fact that costs and benefits will be unevenly distributed.  
•  Multi-gas strategy. The literature generally agrees that a multi-gas strategy reduces compliance 
costs significantly (see Hyman et al., 2002; Kets, 2002; Reilly et al., 2004. Capros et al. (2000) find 
that a ‘6-gas strategy’ approach for the EU ETS could decrease costs by more than a third. 
•  Co-benefits. Some mitigation actions may yield extensive benefits in areas outside climate change, 
which are called co-benefits or ancillary benefits, such as reduced local pollution caused by NOx or 
SO2, less congestion or noise from transport, and savings on fossil fuel subsidies (EEA, 2004b). 
According to the OECD (2002), ancillary benefits have been estimated at anywhere from 30% to 
over 100% of abatement costs. 
•  The timing of policies. It is particularly important to create synergies with business investment 
cycles. This is even more important for the energy infrastructure, which often lasts for several 
decades and sometimes even more.  
•  Participation. The broad participation of many countries reduces the costs of GHG abatement 
policies. According to European Commission models, the costs for the EU could triple in the event 
that no other country participates. But even full participation is no guarantee against distributional 
impacts. 
•  Technology. The extent to which existing technologies are successfully deployed and disseminated 
around the globe and the extent to which new ‘breakthrough’ technologies are developed lowers 
costs. While emerging and future technologies will need to be competitive with existing 
technologies, take-up of new value-propositions can lead to market-driven change that leads to cost 
reduction.  
Costs for mitigation and adaptation cannot be seen in isolation from the damage inflicted by GHG 
emissions. Avoided damages as a result of climate policy constitute negative costs (i.e. benefits). 10 | EGENHOFER & VAN SCHAIK  
 
4.  Preconditions for meeting climate objectives 
Meeting climate change objectives will require major changes in the way we produce and 
consume energy such as achieving higher energy efficiency, switching fuels or installing 
insulation (see section 5). Since climate change objectives will necessitate significant (re)-
building of the infrastructure (see section 4.4) and capital stock turnover (see 4.3), strategies 
must be designed for the long term. Successful climate policy will need to be integrated into 
many key EU and member state policies. In particular, this calls for coherence and integration 
of environmental protection including climate policy into all other EU policies, as is mandated 
by Art. 6 of the EC Treaty. On the other hand, some mitigation options for action are expected 
to yield benefits in areas other than climate change (i.e. co- or ancillary benefits).  
4.1  Research and technology  
Technology will play a central role in meeting the climate change challenge. While there are 
different opinions on whether stabilisation of GHG emissions in line with the UNFCCC’s 
objective can be reached with technically proven technology,
10 it is uncontroversial that there is 
a need to develop new and technically unproven (i.e. breakthrough) technologies in the long 
term.  
Given that technology takes time to develop, especially as long as the global carbon constraint 
remains limited, reductions in the short-term are likely to be achieved by increasing the 
efficiency of existing technology solutions (see 5.1) and by accelerating technology diffusion, 
i.e. to encourage the use of the most efficient technologies
11 in a cost-effective manner (see 4.2). 
Outside of climate change policy, there are constant pressures to improve technology as part of 
the drive to achieve greater competitiveness.  
The European Commission’s Competitiveness Report (European Commission, 2004) identified 
a positive correlation between productivity and levels of research and specialisation in high-tech 
activities. This in return appears to foster an entrepreneurial culture. However, R&D spending in 
the EU – public and private – at 1.9% of GDP lags behind Japan and the US, with 2.9% and 
2.6% respectively.
12 As a result, the EU set itself a target at the Lisbon European Council in 
2000 to increase RTD (research and technological development) spending to 3% of GDP by 
2010.  
R&D and innovation fall within the domain of both private and public spending. R&D in many 
cases can be left to the market. New technologies are likely to be developed in particular if they 
promise economic rent. Companies want to distinguish themselves from their competitors 
through technological innovation. This is mainly the case for the application of new 
technologies, i.e. the area of commercial development or efficiency. Fostering this kind of 
                                                 
10 Pacala & Socolow (2004) and IPPC (2001) argue that the climate problem for the next 50 years could 
be solved with current technologies, whereas Hoffert et al. (2002) hold that new and revolutionary 
technologies would be needed.  
11 For example, those based on a life-cycle analysis. 
12 There has been a clear trend to reduce public funding. Nine OECD countries currently perform more 
than 95% of the world’s public-sector energy R&D (the US, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, 
France, Italy, Canada and Switzerland). Between 1985 and 1995, these nine countries each reduced their 
budgets for energy R&D on average by more than 20% in real terms. Data from the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) show that the trend has not been countered yet; government budgets for energy R&D are 
still falling, although not as fast as in the 1985-95 period (see the “Beyond 20/20” dataserver of the IEA 
for a database on RD&D spending in the IEA member countries (http://www.iea.org/rdd/eng/ 
ReportFolders/Rfview/Explorerp.asp). TOWARDS A GLOBAL CLIMATE REGIME | 11 
 
research is not so much a matter of public funding as of creating appropriate incentives for 
companies, i.e. making research more profitable by addressing market failures. This includes for 
example increased financial resources provided by banks, guarantees for the protection of 
innovation (e.g. patent laws), support for cooperation and research joint ventures, broader 
diffusion of information on a national and international scale, improvements in basic learning 
and innovation (e.g. increased interaction between universities and applied research) and 
technology diffusion via firm-level cooperation agreements (see Galeotti & Carraro, 2003). An 
important observation is that companies with healthy profits and a solid cash flow tend to invest 
more in R&D than those facing economic constraints. A major determinant therefore is the 
economic and business environment in which companies operate.  
In areas where the economic rent is uncertain due to, for example, the level of economic risk or 
a very long time horizon or both (e.g. fusion, hydrogen, CO2 sequestration), R&D cannot be left 
to the market. Market failure is usually associated with basic research or the pre-commercial 
development of new technologies. In these fields governments support is needed.  
In conclusion, governments have to i) provide proper incentives for environmental protection 
and innovation and ii) supplement private sector research that is done for short- and long-term 
strategic economic reasons with socially useful R&D, which due to market failures is not 
undertaken by private investors (Fischer, 2003). Policy measures aimed at advancing 
technological innovation should take into account the following considerations:  
•  Investors must be confident that they can reap the fruits of R&D via for example, efficient 
patent protection systems. 
•  To aid diffusion, governments can take measures to lower information costs and to remove 
other barriers to technology diffusion. 
•  Producers and consumers should pay the full costs, including those from carbon emissions. 
•  But even with an efficient patent and technology diffusion system, firms do not invest in the 
‘right’ kind of R&D; governments need to finance basic research. 
•  As governments have proven to be bad at picking winning technologies, governments 
should provide broad rather than specific R&D subsidies. 
The principal message is that incentives for abatement and innovation are inexorably linked. A 
climate change policy that is independent from technology policy is likely to prove more costly 
and possibly even ineffective. Similarly, technology policy is not a substitute for climate policy. 
If there are no incentives to reduce emissions, too little abatement is performed, in turn 
lessening the incentives for R&D. Equally, if innovation incentives are lacking, climate policies 
are likely to become more costly, which may lead to lower abatement than needed. 
The EU has responded by improving coordination and re-orienting research policy while 
focusing on climate-related research, such as sustainable energy and transport systems as well as 
global change and ecosystems, which altogether saw a budget volume of more than €2 billion 
under the 6
th Research Framework Programme of the European Commission.
13 The  climate 
change focus in the 7
th Framework Programme is likely to continue and be expanded.  
An additional area warranting more research is the set of complicated processes that lead to 
climate change, and their relationship to other elements of human-induced global change. It is 
the natural sciences that have an essential role to play, but since efficient action to mitigate 
climate change will have profound consequences for society, social sciences such as economics, 
political science and sociology will increasingly be involved. This will require increased EU 
and member state funding. 
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4.2  Technology diffusion and transfer 
Once the technology is developed, it will need to be diffused on a global scale. Broader 
diffusion of existing and more efficient new technologies, such as renewables, clean coal, and 
combined heat and power is a prerequisite for industrialised and developing countries alike to 
move to a lower-carbon trajectory while allowing for economic growth. Increasing the uptake of 
new technologies has the additional benefit of reducing costs further. This is encapsulated in the 
learning curve concept, or sometimes referred to as ‘learning by doing’ (see especially section 
5.3.3). 
Within the industrialised world, technology diffusion primarily depends on incentives for 
investment, which inter alia are a function of the long-term stability and the appropriateness of 
the incentives provided by the regulatory environment. Technology diffusion mainly takes place 
through commercial investment decisions of private companies as part of companies’ 
commercial strategies, including foreign direct investment. Governments can influence these 
decisions mainly by shaping an enabling environment to stimulate low or zero carbon 
technologies by addressing for example regulatory, legal, technical, personnel and intellectual 
property issues (see Fischer, 2003). Additional benefits in terms of security of supply or 
development of sunrise technologies, for example, may justify a pro-active policy.  
By and large, the same holds true for technology transfer between industrialised and developing 
countries. Technology transfer is principally undertaken by private companies on a commercial 
basis. To address and compensate for developing countries’ needs, e.g. as capacity-building and 
resources, different funding instruments are available. These include in particular special 
funds,
14 the financial flows of EU and international financial institutions such as the EIB, EBRD 
or the World Bank. Their objective is to leverage private investment, including FDI, many times 
the size of the funds or to provide investment incentives to companies. There is a debate over 
whether the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms, i.e. CDM and JI, should focus more on 
technology transfer. Their original objective had been to assist developing countries to reduce 
emissions and facilitate sustainable development. The CDM in its current shape is not expected 
to lead to very significant technology transfer. Within the context of the UNFCCC, the issue of 
technology transfer seems not have progressed much beyond ‘technology needs assessment’.  
4.3  Aligning climate policy with capital cycles  
The principal source of GHG emissions in the EU is the burning of fossil fuels in the energy and 
transport sectors. Both sectors however are characterised by very high capital investment. The 
capital stock, in the form of power plants, grids and transport infrastructure once built, lasts for 
decades, during which time the investment will need to be paid back. Attempts to reduce 
emissions “too quickly” require early retirement of capital, which in return increases abatement 
costs significantly. Delaying reductions, on the other hand, raises costs for future action because 
the investments that are undertaken now will last for decades and may therefore continue to 
pollute for a long time (see sections 5.1-5.3). 
                                                 
14 For example, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) by 2002 spent about $1 billion on climate 
change projects and leveraged about $5 billion on combined loans with other international financial 
institutions (IEA, 2002). Another fund with a focus on technology transfer is the Special Climate Change 
Fund decided upon at COP6 bis in Bonn in 2001. In the EU, the Commission proposed to establish an 
Energy Facility (€250 million) to support in developing countries “increased use of renewable energy; 
and enhanced energy efficiency, including cleaner and more efficient use of fossil fuel technologies, 
efficient appliances and more efficient use of traditional biomass”. See COM(2004)711 final, 26 October 
2004. See also http://www.euei.org/.  TOWARDS A GLOBAL CLIMATE REGIME | 13 
 
Thus, today’s capital investment decisions will have implications for decades. According to the 
IEA (2004a, p. 72), the global energy sector will require new investment in the magnitude of 
$16 trillion until 2030 under a ‘business as usual’ scenario. This constitutes a major opportunity 
for moving to lower-carbon infrastructure. As shown in a PEW Center study on capital cycles 
(Lempert et al., 2002), investment depends on many different factors, of which external market 
conditions such as expected environmental regulation or oil prices appear to have the most 
significant influence on a firm’s decision to invest or to decommission large parts of the capital 
stock. The study finds that the physical lifetime of capital investment tends to be extended 
through regular maintenance rather than being retired. New investment is mainly driven by 
attempts to capture new markets. The current need in the EU for additional power generation 
capacity of 600 GWe until 2020 offers a major opportunity to create low-carbon capital stock. 
Another key finding of the study is that “however beneficial new technology may be, it will 
likely have little influence on the rate at which firms retire older, more polluting plants in the 
absence of policies promoting technology or requiring statutory emissions reduction” (Lempert 
et al., 2002, p. iv). The exception is performance improvements of large magnitudes. This 
should however not obscure the fact that in the rare event a firm makes major new capital 
investment, carbon prices – even if low – or government incentives make firms focus on cost-
effective abatement opportunities.  
In sum, there are two principal drivers for changes in the capital stock. Major new investment 
tends to be undertaken to capture new markets. Hence, in times of high economic growth, the 
GHG efficiency of the capital stock is expected to go up. In other times, there appears to be less 
scope for significant improvements, unless there are major technological breakthroughs, which 
either can lead to a self-sustaining period of technological change or a significant scale of 
retrofitting of existing capital stock.  
4.4 Public  infrastructure 
A special case is public infrastructure, which is particularly important as it has a long life span 
and predetermines people’s choices of where to live and work, what to consume, what sort of 
economic activities to carry out, and of other people to communicate with. As infrastructure 
investment shares the same feature as capital investment, infrastructure development will be a 
critical factor for both costs and overall effectiveness of climate policies. Moreover, history 
matters. Past infrastructure investment determines the present, although economists disagree on 
how widespread the path-dependency is. The role of governments in infrastructures is however 
more direct than in other capital investment. Infrastructure investments – even if privately 
financed – are under direct government control. It is up to governments whether to invest into 
roads, railways, ports, airports or public transport systems. Nevertheless, the fact that 
infrastructures increasingly are seen as a tool to achieve comparative advantages by countries or 
regions means that infrastructure investment has to follow basic economic rationale. Irrespective 
of new infrastructure investment, better management can however produce important short-term 
results in reducing emissions. A prime example is European air traffic management.  A joint 
study by EUROCONTROL and FAA (2000) found that the planned improvement of the air 
traffic management system would result in savings of 5% fuel and associated CO2 (See 5.2). 
4.5 Synergies   
Climate change policy can have important benefits beyond achieving climate policy objectives. 
These are so-called ‘co-benefits’. Typical co-benefits of climate change measures include the 
reduction of local pollution caused by NOx or SO2, less congestion or noise from transport, 
double-dividend opportunities (e.g. reduced labour taxes and employment creation), innovation 14 | EGENHOFER & VAN SCHAIK  
 
and technological leapfrogging and employment (OECD, 2002 and 2003). According to the 
OECD (2002), ancillary benefits have been estimated at anywhere from 30% to over 100% of 
abatement costs.
 In fact, most studies on reducing GHG emissions assume that the external costs 
of local pollution are higher than the external costs of global GHG reductions.
 Thus, climate 
policy is likely to have significant, but as yet unforeseen benefits.  
Similarly, increasing the penetration of hydrogen in the transport sector could have a positive 
effect on reducing oil-import dependence, notably on countries from the Middle East where 
most if not all of the increased supply is expected to come from. Given the limited domestic 
options to reduce the upward drift in the price inelasticity of domestic oil consumption, more 
radical measures of opening up new energy vectors, especially hydrogen, to supply the transport 
sector may be needed (see Fisk, 2004). This converging interest between the climate change and 
the transport fuel agendas may show the cost/benefit ratio for hydrogen in a most positive light, 
thus creating additional incentives to provide support for hydrogen.  
Nevertheless, there can be real trade-offs between reductions in GHG emissions and other 
environmental policy objectives. There are some conspicuous examples for such trade-offs, 
such as between reducing NOx/SO2 on the one hand and CO2 on the other in air transport or 
between SO2 and CO2 in petrol production. Another example is the end of life vehicle Directive, 
which requires a high level of recycling of cars. To achieve this, cars would have to be 
constructed so that they were more easily disassembled, which subsequently means that they 
would become heavier, thereby increasing fuel consumption. Similarly, the packaging waste 
Directive requires high recycling targets by countries for specific materials, leading to increased 
transportation costs in some countries.
15 There is evidence that strict implementation of the 
water framework Directive by some member states (e.g. Italy and Austria) has reduced the 
hydro generation capacity by a significant margin.  
4.6 Policy  coherence 
Climate change policy objectives can only be achieved if principal EU policies – notably energy 
and transport – are brought into line with the EU’s climate objectives. For example, subsidies to 
fossil fuels prolong their burning and hinder the development and market penetration of lower-
carbon or carbon-free fuels. The EEA (2004c) found that fossil fuel subsidies within the EU still 
amount to about €25 billion p.a. Other principal EU policies worth mentioning are the major 
expenditure programmes such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or the Structural 
Funds, which together account for about three-quarters of EU spending. In addition, the EU’s 
external policies, namely trade, development cooperation and the EU neighbourhood policies, 
should be consistent with EU climate policy objectives. Art. 6 of the EC Treaty calls for 
integration of environmental protection including climate change, into other policy areas. In 
addition, the impact assessment tool that is applied in European Commission policy formulation 
should lead to greater consistency.  
At the international level, coherence can be improved by aligning EU and international financial 
institutions such as the EBRD, EIB or export credit agencies (ECAs). National ECAs worldwide 
provide loans, loan guarantees and risk insurance to promote exports of their countries of origin. 
According to Sussman & Helme (2004), ECA participation in energy-intensive projects 
amounted to about $20 billion p.a., of which they supported about $8.5 billion p.a. in loans, 
guarantees and insurance. Hence, Export Credit Agencies not only participate in a large number 
                                                 
15 For example, the entire country of Sweden has only one glass smeltering plant in the southwest to 
which all used glass containers have to be transported for smelting. On a bigger scale, only a handful of 
PET (polyethylene terephthalate) recycling facilities exist in the EU, thereby also leading to increased 
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of projects, but they also provide significant leveraging of funds. In so doing, they offer a major 
tool to apply this instrument in a way that changes the technology trajectory.  
5.  Concrete reduction options  
This section focuses on sector-specific EU strategies in the short and medium term (2005-20), 
i.e. from now until the period when a more consistent global carbon constraint can be expected 
to emerge. Since short- and medium-term strategies cannot be seen in isolation from longer-
term targets, the analysis will be undertaken against the background of longer-term 
commitments. Finally, although the options we discuss have a strong EU focus, they may have 
relevance beyond the EU, including possibly even in those developing countries that are rapidly 
industrialising.  
5.1 Energy  efficiency 
Energy efficiency holds the biggest potential to reduce GHG emissions. In the World 
Alternative Policy Scenario formulated by the IEA in its 2004 World Energy Outlook, more 
efficient use of energy in a wide range of applications, including vehicles, electric appliances, 
lighting and industrial uses, accounts for almost 60% of the reduction in CO2 emissions. A shift 
in the fuel mix for power generation in favour of renewables and nuclear energy power accounts 
for most of the rest. For the potential reductions identified by the IEA, see Table 3. 
Table 3. Reduction in energy-related CO2 emissions in the IEA’s alternative scenario compared 
to the reference scenario by contributing factor in the period 2002-30 




End-use efficiency gains  58%  49%  63%  67% 
Fuel switching in end-uses  7%  10%  1%  7% 
Changes in the fossil fuel mix in power 
generation 
5% 8%  0%  4% 
Increased nuclear in power generation  10%  12%  21%  5% 
Increased renewables in power generation  20%  21%  15%  17% 
Source: IEA (2004a, p. 379). 
Improved energy efficiency would need to replicate and even reinforce the trends towards 
higher efficiency that has been achieved throughout the 1970s and 1980s. According to the IEA 
(2004b), the greatest reductions of CO2 emissions/GDP took place in the 1970s and 1980s, 
mainly as a result of energy efficiency, which was responsible for about 60% of the total.
16 The 
high energy prices brought on by the oil crises of the 1970s stimulated energy efficiency and the 
search for new energy sources. Similarly the declining energy savings rate in the 1990s can be 
explained by lower relative energy prices from 1986 onwards. For example, the energy share of 
total production costs for industry has fallen by 50%. Similarly, the share of income spent on 
energy has fallen by 20-50%. And compared to overall disposable income, fuel costs for cars 
have fallen by 20-60%.  
Recently, however, energy prices have risen again, drawing increased attention to security of 
supply and notably energy efficiency as a means to ensure the former, whilst at the same time 
                                                 
16 The remaining 40% was attributable to the introduction and extension of nuclear energy, fuel switching 
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reducing CO2 emissions. For the European Commission, energy efficiency has become a key 
priority to be addressed in a special green paper that is due for late spring 2005. According to 
Andris Piebalgs, European Commissioner for energy, Europe should set a target “to save, by 
2010, the equivalent of 70 million tonnes of oil per annum”, representing “a savings of €15 
billion per annum” and “a very significant reduction of CO2”.
17  A Directive on energy 
efficiency
18 that was proposed in December 2003 and that aims at a 1% improvement in energy 
efficiency per year is still under discussion in the Council of Ministers. Energy savings have 
also received increased attention in the energy policies of several EU member states.  
5.2 Transport   
Transport is a significant contributor to economic growth and enables people to participate in 
economic and social activity. Transport contributes in several ways to the GDP. This includes 
the manufacturing of transport vehicles, the production of the fuels, private and public 
expenditure related to the provision of transport infrastructure and the value of transport 
services that are sold by providers of such services. Arguably, the role of transport is even more 
fundamental. The very basic function of transport is to connect people and move goods. Long-
term trends, such as the lowering of global trade barriers or EU enlargement, increase volumes 
of traded goods and therefore transport activity.  
On the other hand, transport is also responsible for negative environmental effects. The fast-
growing transport sector is responsible for more than 20% of total CO2 emissions. About half of 
the emissions growth from 1990 to 2010 is expected to come from this source. Within the 
transport sector, the growth rates of freight transport and aviation are the highest. Efforts to 
reduce specific vehicle emissions have largely been offset by higher demand in the past. This 
does not yet count maritime shipping and international aviation, which still remains outside the 
UNFCCC framework (and the scope of this report). 
Potential of vehicle technologies and transport fuels 
Hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles offer great promise for addressing GHG emissions in the long-
term. In the short and mid-term, however, there is scope for technological improvement in 
existing conventional technologies, such as the internal combustion engine, in a cost-effective 
way. Forecasts give a potential for specific fuel consumption reduction for vehicles with direct 
drive until 2030 of around 20%, compared to current diesel vehicles. Internal combustion 
engines typically convert 15% of the energy content of fuels into useful mechanical work. Even 
small improvements in engine efficiency from 15% to 20% can therefore make a large impact 
on energy demand (see WBCSD, 2004a). The use of hybrid technology can also contribute to 
substantial reductions in CO2 emissions. Combined with advanced aerodynamics, lightweight 
materials, the reduction of rolling resistance (including low rolling resistance tires) and high 
efficiency engines, there is further scope for increased efficiency.  
It is possible that hydrogen (H2) will be the preferred energy carrier for the road transport sector 
in the long-term, capable of meeting necessary volumes and environmental standards. However, 
fossil fuels will be the main source for hydrogen in the next decades – given the fact that the 
costs for producing hydrogen via electrolysis of water will not be competitive for example with 
natural gas reforming. Therefore, until we master carbon capture and storage, hydrogen has little 
                                                 
17  “Towards Zero Emission Power Plants”, speech by Andris Piebalgs, European Commisisoner for 
Energy, SPEECH/05/221, Brussels, 13 April 2005. 
18 Proposal for Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on energy end-use efficiency and 
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value for reducing GHG emissions. And even after technological breakthroughs are achieved, 
hydrogen faces two basic challenges. The first concerns the development of infrastructure; the 
second is the vehicle technology. There is still controversy over which of these two challenges 
is the more difficult to overcome when considering the potential for large-scale use of hydrogen.  
Bio-fuels also offer significant potential to reduce CO2 emissions. Alcohol fuels such as ethanol 
generated from biomass or other renewable sources can be used in gasoline engines. For diesel 
engines, bio-diesel containing biomass-derived fatty acid methyl ester (FAME) is an option. 
Other fuels that cannot be used as blend components, such as compressed natural gas (CNG), 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), di-methyl ether (DME) as well as hydrogen, require a 
significant level of investment in delivery infrastructure. 
An important factor will be the rate of renewal of the vehicle fleet, given that new vehicles must 
meet much stricter standards. Investment in new vehicles, which replace existing stock – as distinct 
from a net increase in the fleet – will thus aid environmental and sustainability objectives. 
However, in the case of private cars (the great majority of new vehicles), it is important that a shift 
to larger, heavier cars does not offset the improvements in energy efficiency and environmental 
impact. In many countries within Europe there are also tax differentials by car size that may offset 
this effect. Increasing the proportion of car taxation that is variable (for example, on fuel rather than 
annual vehicle duty) would further encourage such perceptions (Pelkmans & White, 2000). 
Influence on growth rate 
An earlier CEPS Task Force (Pelkmans & White, 2000) identified the scope of reducing the 
potential growth rate in the passenger sector. Since most growth in the passenger sector is expected 
to stem from greater travel per person resulting from increases in trip length and in trip purposes, 
such as leisure, the passenger sector is likely to be more responsive to price changes. Much less 
scope exists for reducing the rate of growth in freight demand. While the tonnage of goods being 
produced may grow less rapidly than GDP, increasing specialisation of production leads to a 
greater volume of tonne-km being generated. Due to savings in production and inventory costs, it is 
unlikely that this process will be reversed or significantly altered in the short term, even if transport 
costs were to rise rapidly. 
Nevertheless, there is scope for greater efficiency within the road freight sector, which in some 
cases could result in GHG emissions reductions. The same report has also identified some scope for 
modal diversion, especially where public transport (or, for very short trips, non-motorised modes) 
can provide an attractive alternative. Similarly, some short-haul flights could be replaced by high-
speed rail transport as there is scope through developing complementarity between transport 
modes.
19 The growth of ‘park & ride’ systems provides a means by which car users can switch to 
public transport for the greater part of their journey into congested city centres. Conversely, modal 
diversion of freight transport has much less scope, since short-distance movement is already 
handled by road. However, for longer-distance trips, some diversion to rail or shipping is feasible. 
Railways are disadvantaged in gaining a larger market share, however, due to their limited 
marketing and organisational presence outside their national borders. There is also a role to be 
played by land-use planning to reduce the need for longer motorised journeys, for example in the 
location of shops.  
                                                 
19 See the European Commission’s Rail Air Intermodality Facilitation Forum (RAIFF), an initiative to 
stimulate a debate on the ways to develop combined use of rail, in particular high-speed rail services, and 
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5.3  Power sector  
Generation of electricity from fossil fuels, notably natural gas and coal, is the other major 
growing contributor to CO2 emissions. Within the time frame covered in this report and even up 
to a 2050 perspective, there are four possible options for reducing CO2 emissions from the 
power sector: 
•  Increased efficiency in transmission/distribution, generation and fuel switching, mainly to 
gas or CHP; 
•  Expansion of renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, biomass and geothermal; 
•  Capture of CO2 emissions at fossil-fuelled (especially coal) electricity generation plants and 
permanently sequestering the carbon; and  
•  Nuclear power.  
Demand-side measures, which provide additional important instruments, are discussed 
elsewhere in this report.  
5.3.1  Increased thermal and carbon efficiency in the power sector 
Energy efficiency in the power sector, i.e. generation and transmission/distribution, depends on 
a combination of improved performance (due to technological progress) and market penetration 
of such new technologies. The latter depends significantly on when new technologies become 
economical.  
In terms of generation technologies for gas, it is principally gas turbine combined cycle (CCGT) 
and gas turbine combined cycle for combined heat and power (CHP) that hold the greatest 
promise. And for coal, high hopes are pinned to supercritical coal power, integrated coal 
gasification combined cycle power (IGCC) and direct coal-fired combined cycle plants 
(European Commission, 2003). There are major technological improvements in transmission 
and distribution as well. 
Natural gas 
CCGTs are already the most successful power generation technologies, with an expected share 
of 22% in 2030. Further improvements in thermal efficiency from a current 53% to 59% or even 
63% are feasible. Gas turbine cycle for combined heat and power also has potential to achieve 
further improvements of both electric and steam conversion of up to 2%.  
Coal 
All of the above-mentioned advanced coal generation technologies (i.e. supercritical coal power, 
IGCC and direct coal-fired combined cycle plants) can achieve conversion efficiencies of 50% 
or more as opposed to current efficiencies, which are around 40%.  
Whether these technologies will be able to penetrate the market will depend inter alia on fuel 
costs, including the climate constraint, but also on the development of capital costs. Within the 
EU, between now and 2020, around 600GWe
20 (i.e. the current installed capacity) will have to 
be built. The EU faces a major crossroad as to the long-term carbon intensity of the power 
generation sector: with the average lifetime of a gas turbine being 25 years or more and a 
nuclear station between 30-60 years, what is built in the next decade or so will remain in 
operation until around 2050. 
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5.3.2 Renewables 
According to the IEA (2004a) Reference Scenario, renewables used for power generation
21 are 
estimated to reach around 18.3% of the EU’s electricity mix by 2010, below the stated target of 
22% in the renewables Directive (2001/77/EC). A precondition is the continuation of strong 
support measures such as direct payments, fiscal and investment assistance or priority access to 
the network. Additional sources of growth are expected to lie in technological progress and 
greater willingness on the part of the public to purchase ‘green’ electricity. 
Wind power is the main explanation for the increased share of renewable electricity in Europe. 
It is expected to cover 10% of the continent’s electricity needs by 2030 (compared to 1% in 
2004). Under the World Alternative Policy Scenario of the IEA (2004a),
22 renewables as a share 
of total energy demand will reach 16% by 2030. The IEA expects that by 2030 over 40% of 
wind power will be generated in offshore wind farms at a price range of €35-€42 per MWh, 
excluding costs for reserve capacity maintenance, balancing and grids.
23 Biomass offers another 
promising source, which is considered to be economical in industrial applications in the price 
range of €30 per tonne of CO2 (Egenhofer et al., 2005). 
The uptake of emerging and future technologies (e.g. new renewables) depends on their 
competitiveness with existing technologies. Policy can play an important role, however, in 
bringing down costs, through R&D subsidies on the one hand and by support mechanisms, 
which ensure a certain level of market penetration, on the other. Increased market penetration 
has historically contributed to reducing costs (i.e. the learning curve concept). According to the 
IEA, renewables are no different from other technologies. A doubling of the capacity reduces 
costs by half. A critical requirement in this context is the structuring of incentives in such a way 
that they exert a downward cost pressure on renewables technologies, thereby avoiding long-
term economic rents based on ill-designed regulation.  
5.3.3  Carbon capture and storage 
One might expect that coal burning will continue to generate high levels of emissions, because 
major industrialised and developing countries are expected to continue to rely for reasons of 
security of supply on fossil fuels (mainly coal) to generate power. However, fossil fuels can be 
used with minimal atmospheric emissions of carbon dioxide only if the CO2 is captured and 
stored in geological structures (IEA, 2004c). This fact has sparked interest in the different 
existing techniques, post-, pre- and oxy-fuel combustion.
24 Carbon capture and storage is seen 
by many as a key technology to combat climate change. This has also been fully acknowledged 
by the European Commission, which has identified carbon capture as one of its priority areas in 
its research programmes. It is generally acknowledged that further research and development is 
needed to allow large-scale application (see IEA, 2003a). 
Although estimates vary considerably, the technical potential appears to be very high – ranging 
from a minimum of 100 billion to more than 10,000 billion tonnes of CO2 (De Coninck, 2005). 
                                                 
21 Increases in renewables will almost exclusively have to come from new or non-hydro renewables, as 
hydro capacity cannot be further expanded. 
22 The Alternative Scenario is based on a more efficient and environmentally-friendly estimation of the 
energy future vis-à-vis the Reference Scenario. It demonstrates that policies on energy security and the 
environment already considered by countries, together with increased R&D, will lead to reduced energy 
demand and CO2 emissions. 
23  According to the Dena study (2005), the aggregate costs for grid integration of wind energy are 
estimated at €4-€12 per MWh.  
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The IEA (2003a) estimated that the technical potential to store energy-related CO2 emissions 
would be in the range of several decades of current global CO2 emissions at a minimum. Higher 
estimates assume the capacity for capture and storage to be in excess of three centuries’ worth 
of average current emissions (IEA, 2003a; p. 5). 
To date, a number of demonstration projects exist, notably the Sleipner, Weyburn, In-Salah or 
K-12B projects, but there is no large-scale application. Main issues remaining for further 
analysis include, for example, a more accurate assessment of actual storage capacities, safety 
and leakage (i.e. permanence) and also economic viability (IEA, 2004c).  
There are still large discrepancies in cost estimates ranging from below €50 to above 
€100/tonne. Existing technical solutions do not encourage widespread market uptake (IEA, 
2003b, p. 12). The technique of carbon capture and storage has another disadvantage compared 
to abatement: it needs energy. For example, a coal-fired power plant would take an efficiency 
loss when fitted with a system to capture the CO2 from flue gases. This so-called ‘energy 
penalty’ has been estimated in the range of 14-20% using existing technology and still 7-17% in 
2012, assuming improved technologies. Numbers depend largely on the reference technology 
for electricity production (see e.g. Ha-Duong & Keith, 2003). Nevertheless, a number of recent 
studies suggest carbon capture and storage could become an economically viable option, 
although only for new power plants as required retrofitting would raise costs. 
5.3.4 Nuclear 
Nuclear power in principle is a potential source of GHG emissions reductions over the next 50 
years. At present, however, nuclear power faces stagnation and according to most forecasts, 
decline. With a market share of 32% for EU-25, nuclear power displaces between 700 (Foratom, 
2004) – in case nuclear’s share is replaced by the current energy mix
25 – and 300 million tonnes 
of CO2 (European Commission, 2005b), if nuclear were to be replaced by gas. This would 
translate into 16.5% or 7% of (expected) 2010 EU CO2 emissions. However, nuclear’s market 
share is expected to decline to around 25% in 2030 (European Commission, 2003). The 
situation on a global scale is similar. The main reasons for stagnation and decline are costs, 
safety, waste and proliferation (MIT, 2003).  
•  Costs. Within the EU internal energy market, nuclear power is likely not to be cost-
competitive with coal and natural gas. Experience has shown that the power generation 
sector favours the solution with the lowest capital investment and the shortest returns. 
However, reductions by industry in capital costs, improvements in operation and 
maintenance, quicker planning and permit-granting processes to speed up construction, as 
well as the EU emissions trading scheme, could reduce the gap (as recent studies suggest
26 
that costs of nuclear generation in US and EU are getting closer). Prevailing negative public 
opinion increases the economic (as well as political and market) risks
27 and is likely to 
increase the cost gap.  
•  Safety. This requires paying continuous attention to the safety of the overall nuclear plants, 
including their vulnerability to terrorist attacks. 
                                                 
25 2004 EU-25 energy mix in power generation is: nuclear (32%), coal (30%), gas (18%), hydro (11%), 
oil (6%) and renewables (3%). 
26 IEA (2005), University of Chicago (2004); see also http://www.uic.com.au/nip08.htm. 
27The economic risk arises from delays and measures to accommodate opposition that change the 
economics of the project. The political risk is that the government may retreat from its original decision, 
which is particularly high after a change in government. The market risk could involve the damage of a 
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•  Waste. Geological disposal is technically feasible but is not yet applied on a large scale. 
•  Proliferation. The reprocessing system in Europe, Japan and Russia, which involves 
separation and recycling of plutonium, presents major proliferation risks, which cannot be 
controlled.  
The MIT study concludes that in order to reverse the decline in the use of nuclear power, 
changes in government policies are needed. These policies include reducing costs through 
modifications in the permit and planning process, support for new safety-enhancing reactor 
design, federal or state portfolio standards, long-term waste R&D programmes and a shift to the 
open, once-through fuel cycle (MIT, 2003). To become a serious option to reduce GHG 
emissions, EU governments would most likely need to undertake a deliberate ‘pro-nuclear’ 
policy, which they do not seem ready to do. As to technology, the WETO (European 
Commission, 2003) study has developed a scenario where the standard large Light Water 
Reactor as of 2010 is gradually replaced by a new evolutionary nuclear design, which could 
reduce construction costs by 30% by 2030. According to this scenario, the nuclear power share 
worldwide would increase from 9% to over 15.5% (and from 16% to 37% in the OECD). 
It is questionable whether sufficient fuel, i.e. uranium 235, would be available. At a capacity of 
10 TW globally (today’s installed capacity is roughly 0.26 TW), which would equal an 
enhanced nuclear scenario, uranium based on current estimates might last not much longer than 
between 6 to 30 years (Hoffert et al., 2002, p. 985). 
5.4  Buildings and houses 
Buildings and houses offer tremendous potential for reducing GHG emissions, for they are 
responsible for about 40% of all CO2 emissions in the EU if electricity and heat-related 
emissions related to end-use sectors are included (Barbier et al., 2004). The principal savings 
potential lies with space heating (through thermal insulation and higher-efficiency heating 
system) and appliances. Nevertheless, the 40% figure needs to be qualified with the statement 
that the two principal areas – space heating and appliances/lighting, which are responsible for 
95% of demand
28 – will need to be addressed with different policy instruments. During 1990-
2000, energy efficiency in the residential sector increased by around 5%, but this improvement 
was more than offset by two conflicting trends: increases in the dwelling size per capita and 
increases in electricity consumption. As a result, over the same period total energy demand in 
the residential sector grew by 7% in EU-15 (Barbier et al., 2004). According to the statistics, 
however, CO2 emissions decreased as a result of fuel switching to natural gas for space heating, 
thermal insulation, but also because emissions from increased electricity use are normally 
recorded in the power sector. 
Thermal insulation  
According to EURIMA, the European Insulation Manufacturers’ Association, old houses pre-
dating the first oil shock, which make up around 60% of the total housing stock, have energy 
savings reduction potentials of more than 30%. Newer houses built from 1974-94 (accounting 
for about 20%) and more recently (accounting for the remaining 20%) still offer a potential of 
over 15%, although the pay-back period increases from 3 years for old houses to 5 and more for 
newer houses. The principal savings potential lies in insulation of existing building stocks. 
Newly-built houses generally already comply with higher performance standards and therefore 
offer only incremental – and possibly higher cost – savings potential.  
                                                 
28  This figure corresponds to the residential sector alone and represents the EU average. There are 
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The Directive (2002/91/3C) on energy performance of buildings (EPB) tries to address this 
potential, mandating in essence energy-efficiency improvements of newly built and retrofitting 
of existing buildings larger than 1,000 m
2 if they undergo significant renovation. Extending the 
EPB Directive to all houses could save up to 70 Mt CO2 p.a. of an overall technical potential of 
almost 400 Mt CO2 p.a. (Ecofys, 2004),
29 which would equal 2.4% of 1990 EU-15 emissions. 
The potential in the new member states is even higher.  
Table 4. Actual and technical potential of the EPB Directive (in Mt CO2) 
  Actual potential in 2010  Technical potential** 
Current EPB Directive (> 1,000 m
2) 34  82 
Extended to 200 m
2 42  151 
Extended to all houses*  70  398 
* The reason for the big increase in both columns from 200m
2 to all houses is that it is single-family dwellings 
(smaller than 200 m
2) that dominate the existing building stock and that have a particularly high specific heating 
energy demand, partly due to the fact that their external surface per capita is bigger than for multi-family dwellings.  
** See footnote 29 below. 
Source: Ecofys (2004). 
5.5  Developing the EU ETS further  
The EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) is critical for the post-2012 strategy in several 
respects. It is the most important single instrument, targeting almost half of total 2010 EU CO2 
emissions by covering two critical sectors, i.e. power/heat and industry. Furthermore, the EU 
ETS has proven to be industry’s instrument of choice, as several previous CEPS Task Force 
reports have documented. As the EU continues to advocate absolute emissions limits (i.e. Kyoto 
Protocol-type caps), emissions trading almost becomes a prerequisite to achieve these caps at 
the least cost. Both from a practical and strategic perspective, therefore, the EU ETS is the 
centrepiece of EU climate policy, including the post-2012 architecture. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of potentially controversial issues, the distributional impact being among the most 
important. 
The potential of the EU ETS to achieve significant reductions remains uncertain. Most likely, it 
will depend on the existence of a global agreement and consequently, the nature and scale of 
commitments. It is unrealistic to assume that EU governments would impose a significant 
carbon constraint on ‘their’ companies unless major competitors would do the same. As of April 
2005, the initial contribution of the EU ETS remains limited. Eurelectric, the European 
electricity industry association, estimates that the EU ETS contribution under the first round of 
allocation would contribute to savings of around 100Mt CO2 annually.  
The Directive foresees a comprehensive review in 2006 to adapt the EU ETS in the light of 
initial experiences. Inter alia, the review will recommend its possible extension to: i) more gases 
(i.e. non-CO2 greenhouse gases), ii) more sectors (e.g. more industrial sectors, transport) and iii) 
more countries (e.g. via linking), in addition to addressing a number of implementation issues 
such as allocation. Finally, the 2006 review will examine the relationship of the EU ETS to 
international emissions trading (IET) under the Kyoto Protocol.
30  
                                                 
29 The technical potential is far higher but it cannot be achieved taking into account the time lag for 
retrofitting the existing building stock but also the effects of demolition and new construction. 
30 The EU ETS is the subject of a separate CEPS Task Force. Some of the related issues have been 
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5.6 Product  substitution 
Another means of reducing environmental and climate impact is to substitute products with 
others with a lower impact. Construction and telecommunications, which are discussed below, 
offer some possibilities. Naturally-grown materials to serve as product sinks provide other 
examples as does higher material efficiency including recycling. 
A study conducted in the US (Lippke et al., 2004)
31  undertook a life-cycle assessment of 
different construction products and techniques, considering such issues as how materials were 
grown or mined, processed, produced, used and ultimately disposed of. The authors found that 
wood as a construction material can have major climate change and other environmental 
advantages. Other studies (Glass, 2001) have shown that concrete buildings, if appropriately 
designed, may equally hold a climate change advantage as their propensity to store and release 
energy reduces energy consumption for cooling and heating during the entire service life of the 
building. Similar potentials are offered by lightweight steel structures in car manufacturing. 
However, all studies on life-cycle analysis still need to undergo rigorous peer review.  
There is scope for greater use of telecommunications, which could offset some of the need to 
travel, i.e. a substitution effect has yet to materialise between physical mobility and service 
provision at a distance in the form of extensive use of teleworking, telebanking, teleshopping, 
teleconferences or distance education. Since transport services are generally demand-driven, 
policies affecting land-use, vehicle ownership, taxation and industrial structure should be 
coherent and addressed increasingly, although not exclusively, through the prism of climate 
change policy.  
Since changes rely on infrastructure (e.g. building codes, skills in the construction business, 
supply of raw materials, availability of telecoms infrastructure), the potential for substitution 
should be seen in a longer-term perspective and is likely not to play a significant role in a 2030 
perspective. 
6.  Implications for international climate change negotiations  
The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol is seen as an important first step towards reaching a 
global climate change agreement. However, it does not yet amount to a credible long-term 
comprehensive approach towards meeting the UNFCCC goal of stabilisation. Issues have been 
raised regarding environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency and equity (i.e. distributional 
impacts). That the Kyoto Protocol has been rejected by some major industrialised countries and 
that it exempts fast-growing developing countries from any hard carbon constraints make a 
straightforward extension of the treaty (i.e. Kyoto II) environmentally ineffective. In addition, 
capping only one-third of global emissions – as the Kyoto Protocol did in practice– is likely to 
increase total compliance costs as a result of foregone low-cost options in the other two-thirds. 
Since the EU is expected to account for no more than 8% of total 2050 GHG emissions 
(currently, around 12%), reductions in the EU as well as all other industrialised countries would 
not suffice to combat climate change. On the other hand, given that per capita emissions in the 
EU are about three times
32  the emissions of developing countries such as China or India 
(Baumert & Pershing, 2004), it is the responsibility of the EU and other industrialised countries 
to start making reductions. This has been acknowledged both under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
                                                 
31 The Consortium for Research on Renewable Industrial Materials (CORRIM), Seattle, Washington, 
(www.corrim.org). 
32 EU per capita emissions are about 2.5 times the emissions of China and 5.6 times the emissions of India 
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Protocol with reference to the concept of ‘common but differentiated’ responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, the fact that major competitors of the Kyoto Protocol countries have either 
rejected the Treaty or are not subject to legally-binding targets
33 has raised concerns that the 
burdens are unequally distributed. Given the complexity of a global climate change agreement, 
climate negotiators agreed already in 1997 in Kyoto to develop a follow-up treaty when the 
Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012.  
Box 4. Principal requirements of a global climate change agreement: A stylised overview 
Based on the state of the negotiations and legal frameworks, we can identify a number of preconditions 
for a global treaty to work in terms of environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency and 
distributional impact. 
Effectiveness 
o  An effective global agreement will need to include all sources of emissions, including CO2 from 
fossil-fuel burning (59%), non-CO2 gases (23%) and CO2 from land-use change and forestry (18%).  
o  The principle of common and differentiated responsibilities, as included in the UNFCCC, requires 
as a precondition the participation of and ambitious action by all industrialised countries.  
o  By 2030 at the latest, emissions from developing countries are projected to overtake those from 
industrialised countries, which implies that participation and reductions as compared to ‘business as 
usual’ scenarios will also be required from at least the economically fast-growing developing 
countries. 
o  There is an urgency in undertaking reductions now, as greenhouse gases stay in the atmosphere 
over a long period of time.  
o  Although it is controversial whether or not the projected targets until 2050 can be met with existing 
technologies, there is no doubt that in order to meet the long-term stabilisation target, new 
breakthrough technologies will be needed. Hence, research and development as well as technology 
diffusion will become central to meeting climate change objectives. 
o  Despite a high level of uncertainty on what stabilisation means in terms of emissions reductions 
and a cap on the rise in temperature, there is increasing evidence that adaptation to climate change 
both in developing and industrialised countries, including Europe, will be needed. 
Efficiency 
o  Climate change policy at the international level is likely to fail if it is perceived as undermining 
economic development. This is true for industrialised and developing countries alike. Hence there 
is a need for cost-effective (i.e. least-cost) solutions, which points to both the use of market-based 
instruments and the search for synergies between climate and other public policy objectives, such 
as reducing other environmental pollution, security of energy supplies, innovation and job creation. 
o  In the event that emissions trading is adopted, overall compliance costs theoretically decrease to the 
extent that the size of the market (i.e. countries, sectors, gases) increases, provided that the 
emissions market is efficient.  
Distributional effect (equity) 
o  The key criterion for an agreement to be achieved is its distributional effect. Unless there is a sense 
of equitable sharing of costs and benefits, it will remain politically difficult to agree on a 
comprehensive global agreement.  
                                                 
33  The Berlin mandate explicitly decided to exempt developing countries from quantified emissions 
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6.1  The post-2012 architecture and the Kyoto Protocol  
Although there are different views throughout the world as to whether a post-2012 framework 
should be built upon the Kyoto Protocol, it is fair to say that the Kyoto Protocol has established 
or reinforced numerous areas where international consensus has emerged or at least might be 
achievable. These include: i) differentiation, ii) a comprehensive approach to all emission 
sources, iii) gradualism, iv) flexibility and v) flexible mechanisms.  
While differentiation (‘common but differentiated responsibilities’) has been part of the 
international climate change acquis  since the entry into force of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto 
Protocol has reinforced it and attempted to make it operational. At the same time, the Kyoto 
Protocol addresses the problem of climate change in a comprehensive way by including six 
gases and ‘carbon sinks’ such as forests and farm land, which are capable of absorbing GHGs. 
The Kyoto Protocol has acknowledged the need for a gradual approach, i.e. modest initial 
commitments, although the definition is open to interpretation. Gradualism is coupled with 
flexibility to accommodate the complexity of climate change policy arising from a combination 
of the global nature of the problem and hence the solution, the long-term character of 
greenhouse gas abatement and the strong policy interactions. Flexibility can take the form of 
multiple-year commitment periods, banking or sinks. Finally, the Kyoto Protocol has firmly 
established the importance of the use of flexible mechanisms, such as emissions trading and the 
project mechanisms. It seems that these five elements of the Kyoto Protocol will also need to 
figure in any post-2012 architecture.  
The EU has shown a strong commitment both to start reducing GHG emissions and to play a 
major role in multilateral negotiations. Its self-declared policy of leadership has been 
documented extensively in the literature (e.g. Gupta & Grubb, 2001; Kanie, 2003) and has been 
much in evidence in practice. It was the EU that initially led the international effort to ensure 
entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. At the Göteborg European Council in June 2001, the 
then-15 EU member states made a collective political statement to implement the Kyoto 
Protocol, unilaterally if necessary. And indeed, a systematic review of other multilateral 
environmental agreements reveals that leadership (usually by the US) has been one of the most 
decisive elements in achieving an agreement (see Miles et al., 2002). To some extent, EU 
leadership has been successful in convincing other Parties to join the Kyoto Protocol. In the end, 
most industrialised countries, with the notable exception of the US and Australia – although the 
latter has indicated that it will meet its Kyoto Protocol obligations – have ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol. This should however not obscure the fact that many Parties, including the EU itself, 
have difficulties in meeting the Kyoto Protocol commitments. This, together with the fact that 
emissions reductions of all industrialised countries, economies in transition and at least the fast-
growing developing countries will be needed for environmental, economic and equity reasons 
alike, indicates that modifications to the current Kyoto Protocol framework will be needed.  
6.2  Edging towards a post-2012 architecture  
The major challenge in devising the global architecture is to identify the nature and level of 
commitment that will be necessary to provide sufficient incentives for Parties to participate in a 
global agreement.  
Efforts were made in both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol to address the participation 
issue in several different ways. Most importantly, differentiation between emitters according to 
historical emissions, state of development and capacity has been enshrined into the present 
architecture and will continue to remain a central pillar. Other elements include financial 
transfers via emissions trading, including the project mechanisms and specific funds such as the 
adaptation fund.  26 | EGENHOFER & VAN SCHAIK  
 
There have been numerous alternative proposals to enhance participation, incorporating many 
of the ideas from the existing theoretical and empirical literature. Consideration has been given, 
for example, to allowing different time frames for entering into commitments (i.e. a graduation 
concept), to a country’s or region’s response to impacts (i.e. adaptation), to implementation (i.e. 
how to ensure compliance) and to the framework for negotiation (i.e. institutions). Perhaps the 
biggest and most prominent part of the literature in industrialised countries has focused on the 
nature of the commitments (i.e. type of targets) such as absolute caps, efficiency targets, 
technology development or objectives, coordinated carbon taxes, coordinated sector-specific 
domestic policies or a mixture thereof. For an overview of the numerous proposals put forward, 
see Box 5. 
 
Box 5. Different approaches for post-2012  
•  An international agreement with absolute – Kyoto-style – targets, but with modifications such as 
a safety valve, i.e. a maximum price on allowances (Jacoby & Ellerman, 2002; Kopp et al., 1999; 
Hourcade & Ghersi, 2001; McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002). 
•  Energy or carbon-intensity targets to improve energy efficiency. Ultimate targets can be an equal 
per capita emissions target (Meyer, 2003; Müller et al., 2001). 
•  Linkages, i.e. linking participation to R&D cooperation or financial transfers (Buchner et al., 2003; 
Buchner & Carraro, 2003; Carraro & Galeotti, 2003). 
•  Environmental conditionality that links emissions trading to environmental ‘progress’, e.g. the 
Green Investment Scheme, trade and back approaches (Tangen et al., 2001; Blyth, 2003; Viguier, 
2003). 
•  Sector-specific targets, i.e. a coordinated approach for domestic policies (e.g. IEA, 2002, p. 82). 
•  Coordinated global carbon taxes (Cooper, 2001). 
•  Technology development and international cooperation on R&D activities, often referred to as 
‘technology protocol’ (Humphreys, 2001; Barrett, 2003; Edmonds, 2003). 
•  A combination of different instruments, such as a combination of the intensity targets, sector-
specific domestic measures and technology development in the so-called ‘triptych approach’ 
(Phylipsen et al., 1998; Den Elzen, 2002). 
•  Orchestra of treaties focusing on different co-existing commitments under different legal 
frameworks (Sugiyama et al., 2003). 
For a comprehensive survey of post-2012 approaches, see also Bodansky (2004).  
Source: Egenhofer et al. (2004). 
 
When assessing different sets of commitments against criteria – such as environmental outcome, 
economic efficiency, cost-effectiveness, distributional impacts, flexibility and simplicity – and 
incentives to participate and comply, there is no single framework including the Kyoto Protocol 
that would meet all the evaluation criteria (see for example Aldy et al., 2003b; Bodansky, 2004; 
Torvanger et al., 2004; Kameyama, 2004). 
6.3  Six elements of a post-2012 architecture  
A comprehensive agreement on the post-2012 regime will need to ensure a fair amount of 
continuity with the Kyoto Protocol structure, while at the same time accommodating a number 
of additional components aimed at attracting near-universal participation in a global agreement. TOWARDS A GLOBAL CLIMATE REGIME | 27 
 
6.3.1  Nature of commitments  
The Kyoto Protocol has set absolute targets for industrialised countries. Despite their merits of 
relative simplicity as a negotiation tool and of sensitivity to environmental integrity, such an 
approach is inherently inflexible. In particular, it could not accommodate differences in 
economic or population growth. Targets that are negotiated and agreed at international levels 
but do not lead to a perception of an equitable outcome risk not being respected. The more 
stringent the targets, the higher such a risk will be. To accommodate the risk of non-compliance 
arising from an inequitable outcome of the negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol foresaw relative 
short-term targets, subject to periodic revision. Short-term targets, however, can cause 
behavioural changes, but they are unable to trigger the required structural changes on account of 
their on-going renegotiation. The time frame of policy cycles concerning climate change may 
not coincide with that of business in which an investment decision is made on a mid- to long-
term basis (see Aldy et al., 2003b; Reinstein, 2004; Lempert et al., 2002 and IEA, 2002, for an 
overview).  
Success in phasing out ozone-depleting substances in a multilateral framework, i.e. the Montreal 
Protocol, is generally credited to the absolute cap approach. However, the Montreal Protocol 
had special features such as readily-available technologies, and perhaps most importantly, it was 
recognised that the only solution to avoid ozone depletion was to phase out the responsible 
substances. It is also often forgotten that the Montreal Protocol foresaw reviewable exemptions 
for ‘essential uses’ (Victor, 2005). To induce compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, several 
approaches were proposed and some were introduced to reduce the rigidity of absolute targets, 
including the flexible mechanisms, banking provisions, periodic revision of relative short-term 
targets, transfers and possibly most important price caps on allowance prices, the so-called 
‘safety valves’ (Kopp et al., 1999; McKibbin & Wilcoxin, 2002; Hourcade & Ghersi 2002; 
Jacoby & Ellerman, 2002). It is interesting to note in this context that if the value of an 
internationally agreed safety valve is low enough, it will in effect function as a globally 
harmonised carbon tax, doing away with multilaterally negotiated quantitative emissions targets 
(Jacoby & Ellerman, 2002).  
The developing countries will continue to refuse to accept absolute quantitative targets. At the 
same time it is clear that somewhere along the line, the largest emitters among the developing 
countries will have to accept to limit their emissions in an internationally agreed way. Different 
approaches of the kind envisaged in section 6.2 above will probably be tested in the 
negotiations. Other central questions will relate to the timing of commitments, possible 
graduation and issues related to the base year. It will be necessary for all Parties to show 
flexibility and imagination in creating the basis for a long-term stable climate regime.  
6.3.2 Flexible  mechanisms 
An absolute target approach must be seen in conjunction with emissions trading, both in the EU 
and internationally. As the EU continues to advocate absolute emissions limits (i.e. Kyoto 
Protocol-type caps), emissions trading almost becomes a prerequisite to achieve these caps in a 
least-cost fashion. Should absolute caps prevail, emissions trading is almost certainly to occupy 
a centrepiece of the post-2012 regime.  
There seems to be broad agreement at least in principle on the importance of flexible 
mechanisms. Especially since the CDM faces design and implementation problems, there is a 
need for reform to make the CDM a major tool for both developing and industrialised countries 
to combat climate change. It is critical for the EU to make the EU ETS work in order to prove 
the suitability of emissions trading in practice as a tool towards this end. 28 | EGENHOFER & VAN SCHAIK  
 
6.3.3 Adaptation 
For many developing countries, a satisfactory inclusion of an agreement on adaptation measures 
will most likely be a precondition for participation. As the European Commission 
Communication (European Commission, 2005a) points out, even meeting the EU’s 2°C target 
will most likely lead to a negative climate change impact. Thus, to increase resilience, 
adaptation measures are almost certainly to be needed. This has prompted the European 
Commission to identify adaptation as one of the four principal climate change challenges. 
Although this report has primarily dealt with mitigation and technology, it is important to 
reiterate that adaptation both in the EU and other industrialised and developing countries is 
likely to become a crucial pillar upon which an eventual global agreement will rest. 
6.3.4  Technology approaches  
In the long run, technology will play a decisive role, as ultimately stabilisation of GHG 
emissions at politically acceptable levels can only be met with new breakthrough technologies. 
A number of technology approaches have stressed the crucial role of technology in stabilising 
concentrations of GHG emissions at low costs, the need for a portfolio of R&D investments 
across a broad spectrum of technology classes, and integration of energy technology 
development as part of a larger comprehensive strategy (e.g. Humphreys, 2001, Edmonds, 2003; 
Barrett, 2003). The focus is on fostering international cooperation of both public and private 
sectors. The major shortcoming of such a ‘technology-only’ approach is that it provides little 
incentive to apply advanced technologies, which by definition would have high costs but no real 
economic benefit for a company, unless research support is seen as a mere subsidy or state aid. 
The approach does not necessarily guarantee real emissions reductions – at least in the short to 
mid term – and risks missing the potential of current technologies. Hence, the long-term 
technology focus needs to be complemented with incentives to apply technologies, for example 
with further protocols for the short-term options such as ‘targets and timetables’ or other 
commitments or domestic measures. 
6.3.5  Domestic measures  
One of the issues of Kyoto Protocol-type ‘top-down’ approaches (‘what needs to be done’) has 
been that negotiations tended to be disconnected from the reduction potentials that Parties 
actually possess in reducing emissions. Therefore, focusing on the potential of short- and 
medium-term policies across sectors to translate potential absolute emissions targets into 
specific commitments (i.e. ‘what can be done’), can help Parties to base negotiating positions on 
a firmer footing, thereby reducing the risk of non-compliance. Credible domestic long-term 
comprehensive climate policies can be expected to induce countries to accept long-term 
commitments. They will most likely provide authoritative analysis on underlying costs of 
policies, benefits in terms of avoided damage, co-benefits such as other environmental benefits, 
technological innovation and improved economic efficiency (see for example Browne, 2004). 
Credible national and EU policies addressing climate change are crucial both for international 
credibility and for understanding of what is economically and politically feasible.  
6.3.6  Institutional framework  
Legally speaking, the negotiating framework is the (global) UN system, but in reality the 
delicate balance between conflicting interests has dictated the discussions. This is even more the 
case after the United States defected. In fact, the negotiations to date have been characterised by 
attempts to find a balance between the EU, the US, Japan, Russia, other Parties and developing 
countries (see Den Elzen & de Moor, 2001; Egenhofer & Cornillie, 2001; Grubb & Yamin, TOWARDS A GLOBAL CLIMATE REGIME | 29 
 
2001; Ott, 2001). This raises the question of which framework would be the most appropriate 
for climate negotiations (cf. Victor, 2001; Bodansky, 2002). Does the focus on the UN system 
still reflect the reality or have we de facto moved to a system where groupings of key countries 
form an informal ‘directorate’ including the EU, the US, Japan, Russia plus key developing 
countries such as China, India, Brazil, and others? An approach based on a ‘directorate’, ‘like-
minded countries’ or ‘major emitters’ may possibly be more effective as asserted, for example, 
by Bodansky (2002). Reducing the number of actors to a few increases the likelihood of finding 
an agreement.  
Irrespective of whether such a major-emitters’ approach could constitute a feasible way 
forward, there is a distinction to be made between the UNFCCC’s role as a negotiation platform 
and as a ‘coordination’ body for implementation. While informal negotiations can and in reality 
will take place in many different fora including the UN but also the G8, or in bilateral ones (e.g. 
EU-US, EU-China), there is no alternative to the UNFCCC for managing the formal 
negotiations and overseeing coordination of the management of the flexible mechanisms, the 
registry system, national communications, compliance rules, etc. It may be possible, however, 
to delegate certain coordination tasks to executive agencies.  
7. Concluding  remarks 
It has been acknowledged that climate change is one of the world’s greatest challenges with 
potentially far-reaching negative effects, but yet at the same time it is very hard to reach a global 
agreement. The climate change challenge is associated with a number of well-known features 
(see Carraro & Galeotti, 2003). The problem is global. Climate change is a global public good, 
inclining states to free-ride. In addition, the problem is long term. Uncertainty is pervasive. 
There are no magic technological solutions available. Policy interactions are strong as climate 
change policy affects many of the key national, EU and international policies, including notably 
development. At the same time, the consequences of climate change will most likely be 
irreversible. There is no international institutional framework that is able to deal with the many 
complexities associated with climate change. While it is true that other environmental issues 
possess some of the same features, the climate change challenge has higher intensity and 
stronger interaction.  
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were first steps to address the climate change challenge. 
Further steps will be needed at national, regional and global level. This CEPS Task Force hopes 
that it has made a useful contribution to the international climate change debate.  
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Annex 1 
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 
 
AAU  Assigned Amount Unit, a part of the overall absolute target of GHG 
emissions assigned to Annex B Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
Absolute target  A cap on emissions expressed in absolute terms (e.g. X tonnes of CO2); 
see also sector-specific targets and intensity targets) 
Annex 1  Annex 1 of the UNFCCC refers to industrialised countries (including many 
economies in transition) 
A1B IPCC  scenario 
B2 IPCC  scenario 
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy (of the EC) 
CCAP  Center for Clean Air Policy (see: http://www.ccap.org) 
CCS  Carbon Capture and Storage. Technologies to capture and store CO2 in 
geological structures 
CCGT  Combined Cycle Gas Turbine 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism: Art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes 
that Annex I Parties (and firms in these countries) can transfer certified 
emissions reductions (CERs) from projects in developing countries 
CHP  Combined Heat and Power (co-generation), which has a conversion 
efficiency of 70% or more 
COP  Conference of the Parties, consisting comprising representatives of 
governments that are Party to the UNFCCC. The COP is the supreme 
decision-making body in the UNFCCC negotiations  
CO2  Carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas (GHG) covered in the Kyoto 
Protocol 
CH4   Methane, one of the six GHGs covered in the Kyoto Protocol 
CNG   Compressed Natural Gas, a transport fuel with relatively low carbon 
intensity 
DME  Di-Methyl Ether, a relatively low carbon fuel that could be used for 
transport 
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EC  European Communities, referring to the economic competencies of the 
European Union 
ECA   Export Credit Agency 
ECCP  European Climate Change Programme, the European Commission’s 
programme to consult with stakeholders on climate change 
EEA  European Environment Agency 
EIB  European Investment Bank 
EPB Directive  Directive (2002/91/3C) on energy performance of buildings 
ET  Emissions Trading: generic term for trade of emissions rights (see also EU 
ETS, IET, International Emissions Trading) 36 | EGENHOFER & VAN SCHAIK  
 
EU  European Union (see also EC) 
EU ETS  EU Emissions Trading Scheme, covering CO2 emissions from industry and 
the power sector 
EU neighbourhood policy  EU policy framework for relations with neighbouring countries, that have 
no immediate prospect of membership or are outside the geographical 
boundaries of the EU 
European Council  Regular meetings of the heads of all EU governments to discuss and set out 
the strategic direction of the EU 
EU R&D Framework 
Programme 
The EU’s financial instrument to support R&D 
FAME  Fatty Acid Methyl Ester; a biofuel that could be used in diesel engines 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
F-gases  Three GHG gases with a High Global Warming Potential: Hexafluoride 
(HF6), Perfluorcarbons (PFCs) and Hydrofluorcarbons (HFCs ) 
Flexible Mechanisms  Those market-based mechanisms established by the Kyoto Protocol that 
allow the transfer or exchange of emissions reductions obligations between 
Parties. Sometimes also referred to as the Kyoto Mechanisms or 
Mechanisms (see also CDM, JI, ET) 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GHG 
 
Greenhouse gas, usually referring to one of the six gases covered by the 
Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6). 
GW or GWe  Gigawatt electric; measure for installed capacity in power sector. One GW 
is 1.000 MW 
GWP  Global Warming Potential. The index used to translate the level of 
emissions of various gases into a common measure (usually CO2) 
Greenhouse effect  The earth has a natural temperature control system. Certain atmospheric 
gases are critical to this system and are known as greenhouse gases. On 
average, about one third of the solar radiation that hits the earth is reflected 
back to space. Of the remainder, some is absorbed by the atmosphere but 
most is absorbed by the land and oceans. The earth's surface becomes 
warm and as a result emits infrared radiation. The greenhouse gases trap 
the infrared radiation, thus warming the atmosphere. Naturally occurring 
greenhouse gases include water vapour, carbon dioxide, ozone, methane 
and nitrous oxide, and together create a natural greenhouse effect. Human 
activities are causing greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere to increase 
and this has occurred to such a level as to bring about climate change. 
G-8  Regular summit of the heads of the eight most important economies 
GtC  Gigatonne of carbon (1 Gt = 1,000 Mt) 
GtCO2  Gigatonne of carbon dioxide 
hectare 10,000  m² 
Hydrogen (H2)  Energy carrier that if produced by carbon-free fuels such as renewables or 
nuclear is theoretically carbon free. 
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IET  International Emissions Trading, as established under Article 17 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, allowing Annex B Parties to trade Assigned Amount Units 
(the GHG emission units of the Kyoto Protocol)  
IGCC  Integrated Coal Gasification Combined Cycle 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change, a scientific body created by 
the UN, generally assumed to be the most authoritative source on climate 
change science, which operates on the basis of peer review 
Intensity target  The level of GHG emissions per unit of economic output (e.g. GDP) 
JI  Joint Implementation: Art. 6 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes that Annex I 
Parties (and firms in these countries) can transfer Emission Reduction 
Units from individual projects 
Kyoto Protocol  1997 Protocol under the UNFCCC to reduce GHG emissions globally. It 
entered into force on 16 February 2005 and will cover the period from 
2008-2012; After 2012, a new framework or protocol will be needed. See 
“post-2012 framework” 
LPG   Liquefied petroleum gas; transport fuel with a relatively low carbon-
intensity 
Mb/d  Thousands of barrels per day 
MIT  Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
mpg  Miles per gallon (US) 
Mt  Million of tonnes. One Mt of CO2 in the atmosphere is equivalent to 0.3 Mt 
carbon 
MtCO2e  Millions of tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, the most commonly used 
way to express quantities of GHGs 
MW  Megawatt electric; measure for installed capacity in power sector. One 
MW is 0.001 GW 
NGO Non-Governmental  Organisation 
NOx  Nitrogen oxide, a precursor of acid rain  
N2O  Nitrous oxide, one of the six GHGs covered by the Kyoto Protocol 
Parties  Countries that are party to the UNFCCC. The European Community is also 
a Party 
Post-2012 framework  Describes the – yet to be established – global framework beyond 2012 to 
reduce GHG emissions, when the Kyoto Protocol expires 
ppm/ ppmv  Parts per million/parts per million volume, the most commonly used way 
to express quantifies of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. Usually 
expressed in CO2-equivalent whose value is established on the basis of the 
Global Warming Potential (GWP) for each GHG 
PV  Photovoltaic; technology to generate solar energy 
Radiative forcing  The change in the balance between radiation coming into the atmosphere 
and radiation going out. A positive radiative forcing tends on average to 
warm the Earth’s surface and a negative forcing tends on average to cool 
the surface 
R&D   Research and development, sometimes also called RTD, research and 
technological development or RD &D, research, development and 
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Sequestration  The capture of CO2 in sinks 
Sinks 
 
The ability of land to absorb CO2. Land-use changes that lead to sinks 
(such as afforestation, reforestation) or remove sinks (e.g. deforestation), 
are counted against a country’s emissions 
SO2  Sulphur dioxide, a precursor of acid rain  
Sector-specific target  A GHG emissions reduction target for specific sectors (e.g. energy 
intensive industry) 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreed at the 
UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992). 
The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilise GHG emissions at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. The most important climate agreement negotiated in the 
UNFCCC so far is the Kyoto Protocol 
WBCSD  World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
WETO  World energy, technology and climate policy outlook, produced by the 
European Commission  
WRE profiles 
 
A widely-used set of CO2 concentration stabilisation pathways (or 
‘profiles) devised by Wigley, Richels and Edmonds. The WRE profiles 
were designed to take account of the economic costs of reducing CO2 
emissions below a no-policy baseline (‘mitigation’) by assuming that the 
departure from the no-policy case is initially very slow (negligible in the 
idealised WRE cases) 
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